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The popular rise of Chinese microblogging tools has proposed new challenges and 
opportunities for both Chinese authorities and Chinese Netizens. This project explores how 
microblogging tools, exemplified by Sina Weibo, positions itself within the greater Chinese 
online sphere, and what limitations and possibilities can be identified within the content 
diffused across such a network.  
 
By applying a theoretical framework of the public sphere, Sina Weibo is argued to be a space 
that favors interaction across social and geographical boundaries within an easy to use 
infrastructure. Due to high-speed and a saturated format of posts of text, image and video, 
microblogs have a potential to spread information in small but meaningful packages.  
 
A content analysis of 281 posts regarding the Wenzhou train crash, and five leaked media 
directives regarding the same incident, identified microblogs to have an important yet limited 
agenda-setting function; important as it offers a meaningful alternative to traditional media 
outlets who remain more deeply subdued by content regulating directives, but limited in lack 
of significant offline consequences being observed, as well as overall issues of trustworthiness 
affecting the quality of content.  
 
As part of the same controlled and censored sphere as other off- and online media, Chinese 
microblogging applications are unsurprisingly discovered to have a clear limitation in overt 
censorship like blocking and removal of content. Nevertheless are microblogs also identified 
to offer high levels of flexibility within its controlled frames, where diverse and balanced 
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On July 23 2011 two trains crashed near the city of Wenzhou in the Zhejiang province of 
China. The stories of those who passed and those who struggled to survive are found within 
these pages. Behind numbers and descriptions, I hope you will sense the grieving heart and 
deepest condolences offered to those who left and those left behind, sent with deep respect 
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1 Introduction 
The popular rise of Chinese microblogging tools has proposed new challenges and 
opportunities for both Chinese authorities and Chinese Netizens (online citizens). After riots 
in the western province of Xingjiang in 2009, the Chinese government blocked Chinese 
Netizens from accessing Facebook, and continued with blocking another popular social media 
application, the microblogging platform Twitter (Wauters 2009; Canaves and Chao 2009). 
Ever since blocking access to two of the most used social media tools worldwide, China has 
met domestic social networking demands by developing social internet applications that cater 
to the social media needs of the 500 million Chinese Netizens (CNNIC 2012). These 
applications, often starting out as clones of their international counterparts, have developed 
special characteristics on their own merit, and have gained a prominent position on the 
Chinese online agenda in recent years. With both online technology and online content tightly 
controlled by the Chinese authorities, the infrastructure of Chinese social media applications, 
and Netizens use of these applications, proposes interesting and delicate challenges of 
negotiating expression within the restricted environment for expression in China.  
 
Questions of what implications the rising popularity if social media might have in China was 
amongst others asked in form of the tellingly titled headline ‘Can Social Media push change 
in China?’ by online editor for the Hong Kong University media research program, China 
Media Project, David Bandurski (2011), in October 2011. Overall, this research program 
offers great insight to a media sphere that at times comes across as both complex and 
overwhelming, and this particular question strikes an extra interesting note, because it 
highlights a theme that has grown in importance and complexity over the last couple of years; 
might increasingly popular Social Media tools be used for more than sharing the latest picture 
of your cute cat, keeping track of ex-boyfriends, and sharing funny videos, and actually help 
push social change in vastly different societies all over the world?  
 
According to Bandurski the development and popularity of Chinese social media platforms 
have  “[…] tempted some to a cowboy-Western reading of the landscape, in which they 
imagine social media socking it to those in power” (Bandurski 2011). However, the Chinese 
institutions are also adjusting to these new times of information sharing, with the authorities 
encouraging online dialogue and officials venturing into the various platforms of social media 
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(see Bandurski: 2011, Yan, Zhang and Liang: 2011, Offbeat China: 2012). In 2011 many of 
the top Chinese news stories were indeed defined in part by online social media (Bandurski 
2011a), but a trend for public demand of greater openness in so-called sudden-breaking 
incidents (61) can however be traced back to social media-free times like the SARS-
epidemic in 2003, indicating that social media is just one of the factors in an already very 
complex and multifaceted Chinese media sphere. In a media policy statement given at a visit 
to the newspaper People’s Daily in 2008 by Hu Jintao, the Chinese president himself stated a 
need for more rapid reporting in regards to sudden-breaking incidents (Ibid)1. However, Hu 
Jintao also put great emphasis on ‘correctly channeling public opinion’ (aV ­¸), 
a nuanced version of the former ‘correct guidance of public opinion (­¸V;)’, that 
like its predecessor indicated a level of control, while emphasizing that the ruling Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) should make targeted efforts in their use of both old and new media 
channels to influence Chinese citizens (Ibid).  
 
As a frontline of negotiating power between offline and online media in China, the new media 
holds a strong point in challenging the traditional propaganda apparatus by being able to 
move fast enough to handle the high levels of speed of information diffusion. Traditional 
media outlets move slower, and are also subjected to a wide array of content regulating 
directives issued by the government. Online media are also subjected to such directives, but 
from the time a content regulating directive has been issued and spread to the relevant media 
outlets for implementation, a substantial information base could already have been build by 
Netizens.  
 
Being such a fast moving medium that facilitates rapid information diffusion in sudden 
breaking incidents, Chinese microblogging applications holds a particularly interesting 
position in the intersection between censorship and public discourse. Adding to mere speed, 
microblogging platforms offers an additional power for negotiating expression is due to 
infrastructures that favors hybrids of media expressions. This ‘hybridity’ is expressed in a 
                                                
1 For in-depth English commentary on Hu Jintao’s media policy, see Bandurski. (2008). ‘Propaganda leaders 
scurry off to carry oyt the “spirit” of Hu Jintao’s “important” media speech”, China Media Project. Available at 
http://cmp.hku.hk/2008/06/25/1079/, (Last accessed 29.11.12) or see the Chinese version of the speech, “>+'
, / F0  [Speech While Inspecting the Work of the People’s Daily]” available at 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/7408514.html (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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mixture of text, images and video that is facilitated by the technical infrastructure of the 
application, but with meaning of content being dependent of Netizen-contribution. These 
mixtures of media expressions are rich in format, easy to distribute, and at times they might 
even be found to float by unnoticed, intentional or not, on the censorship-radar that 
characterizes the Chinese online sphere. 
 
Despite a general interest in the use and effects of social media platforms in China, 
microblogging platforms has yet to be thoroughly examined in academia. Studies exploring 
content control (Bamman, O’Connerand Smith 2012) and temporal aspects of trends and 
trend-setters on Chinese microblogging applications (Yu, Asur and Huberman  2012) have 
produced valuable insight, discovering that content deletion rates are higher in outlying 
provinces like Tibet compared to Beijing (Bamman, O’Connerand Smith 2012), and that as 
much as 49% of posts shared by microblogging applications might actually be spam (Yu, 
Asur and Huberman 2012). But what are the overall characteristics of Chinese microblogging 
applications? How do they function and why do they seem to be so valuable for Chinese 
Netizens? Inspired by influential works by scholars such as Yang (2003; 2007; 2009), Zhao 
(1998) and Lagerkvist (2006; 2010), who all offer valuable contributions to the overall 
discussion of online reality in China, this thesis takes a closer look at one specific area of 
Chinese social media, the use of microblogs, but in a more overall approach to the 
phenomenon in order to secure a basic understanding of the fundamental functions of 
microblogs in China. By exploring Sina Weibo, one of the most popular microblogging 
applications developed in China, this study explores the position of microblogs in the greater 
context of online China, and aims at identifying main limitations and opportunities of 
microblogging applications within a theoretical framework of the public sphere. 
A case study approach is applied to examine the layers of Sina Weibo; first the infrastructure 
of Sina Weibo is explored in an observational manner in an effort to explain how information 
is diffused by microblogs in China; secondly a qualitative content analysis of posts from Sina 
Weibo seeks to identify some of the opportunities and limitations microblogs reflect in 
diffusion of information within a government-controlled media sphere.  
 
The analyzed microblogging posts from Sina Weibo all relate to the same incident. On the 
evening of July 23 2011two trains crashed close to the city of Wenzhou in the eastern 
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province of Zhejiang. With 40 fatalities and at least 192 injured, the tragic event gained 
widespread attention both on- and offline in China. State planning for high-speed railway in 
China started during the 1980s, developing so rapidly that China by 2011 had expanded high-
speed rails across the world’s most extensive network, covering 8,358 km (Xinhua 2012a)). 
That being said, the Chinese high-speed railway enterprise has also been controversial, with 
former Railway minister Li Jizhun being accused of embezzling close to 750 million RMB 
(121 million USD) during his eight years of administration of the railway ministry (Fischer 
2012). With train-travel being the preferred, and at times only economical available, choice 
for hundreds of millions of Chinese, the project and its controversy are major issues of public 
interest. The first reports of the Wenzhou train cash originated from within one of the train 
sets, when a passenger pleaded for help using her Sina Weibo profile. During the following 
hours and days after the crash the microblogging platform flooded with information and 
discussions on the crash, running seemingly unhindered in online channels. Diffusion of 
content-regulating directives regarding the accident seemed to be surprisingly slow as one 
might suspect the authorities to judge the crash a rather sensitive incident in regards to the 
controversies at hand. Directives concerning the crash did however also finally surface, some 
of which was later also leaked online.  
1.1 The social Internet  
In a somewhat romantic view of communication history, social media has been around since 
the first cave wall carvings. Eric Harr, blogging for Social Media Today, characterized 
the Chauvet-Pont-d'Arc cave paintings, dating back to 30.000 BC, as “Twitter on a sandy 
wall” (Harr 2011). When using this analogy, any form of non-verbal communication 
accessible to others over time could fit into the social media category. Following this basic 
characterization, innovations throughout media history like the invention of book printing, the 
telegraph, radio and TV would also be regarded as forceful pioneers of developing social 
media; these mass-communications channels all broke down boundaries of geography, 
economy and class as they gradually gained prominence in our everyday lives, making 
communication easier. But all these mass-communication channels, none has held a greater 
social promise than the Internet, knowing its potential for two-way communication. . With its 
democratic bone structure and in principle being open for all, the Internet is a free and in 
theory a vessel for unhindered flow of information. With any piece of information accessible 
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at your fingertips, the Internet could very well be used to learn how to build a bomb, or to 
engage forums filled with hate speech, adding emphasis to arguments that some kind control 
mechanisms should be integrated to the Net as well. One can argue that most information is in 
some sense or another regulated; be it within the frames of a church community, sovereign 
governments, professional media houses, the note pad of a journalist, or the topics chosen 
around the dinner table, or in conversation with an acquaintance you happened to meet on the 
street. As laws, regulations and information controlling mechanisms caught up with the 
Internet, moderators have been introduced to control online forums, and we’ve seen large-
scale suits regarding issues such as online file sharing. Questions of privacy and right to 
access of information has also been raised, as courts have had to take a stand in how to handle 
information handed over by Internet service providers, and how to handle online diffusion of 
classified information in the name of freedom of speech (MacKinnon 2012).  
Despite the presence of regulatory tendencies, the perhaps most fascinating aspect of the 
Internet is its ability to diffuse information to millions of potential receivers all over the world 
in just seconds. Furthermore, the Internet greatly facilitates individual statements, with a low 
threshold – all one needs is a computer device with Internet access - for personal expression. 
Information of various sorts has for thousands of years been spread and developed through 
new communications channels to readers, listeners and viewers in large sums, but has in 
general been produced by professionals, working in publishing, newspapers, radio and 
television. The age of Internet, on the other hand, adds the possibility for users to generate 
their own content and spread their message using whatever online tool they themselves find 
most appropriate and effective, on a large scale.  
1.2 Defining social media 
The terms “User Generated Content”, “Web 2.0” and “Social Media” are often used 
interchangeably to describe online tools that encourage users to connect with each other in 
different ways, and to actively produce different types of content, by use of written text, 
images, pictures, videos and so forth that is accessible to others online. Kaplan and Haenlein 
(2010) call for the need to take a step back and revise what Social Media really is, and maybe 
even more importantly, what it is not.  
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Parts of the reason why these terms are used interchangeably are the non-linear history of the 
origin of the terms. The concept of ‘Web 2.0’ was introduced as a way of describing new uses 
of the World Wide Web, for both software developers and end-users alike, where applications 
and content no longer solely was created by individuals, but instead continuously modified by 
all users in a collaborative manner (Ibid: 61). This technological and ideological foundation is 
what ‘User Generated Content’ (UGC) continues to build upon. The term is usually applied to 
describe the various forms of content that are publicly available and created by end-users 
(Ibid), the Netizens. To be classified as UGC, the content should be published on a publicly 
accessible website or social networking site accessible to a selected group of people; show a 
creative effort (reposting a link to a newspaper article online is not UGC); and be produced 
outside of professional routines and practices (Ibid). Upon these fundamental concepts, 
Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) understand Social Media as “[…] a group of Internet-based 
applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that 
allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content” (p. 61).  
1.3 Focus of study and research questions  
As part of one of the most controlled and heavily restricted online spaces in the world 
(Deibert et. al 2008: 268; Deibert et. al 2010: 473)), China has seen an interesting 
development holding a number of unique characteristics. Without access to world-wide 
popular social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, domestically developed 
social media applications have attracted millions of Chinese Netizens to their alternative take 
on these social media classics. The phenomenon of microblogging in China has a short 
history, and the implications of popular use of such applications are yet to be discovered. 
Nevertheless, a study isolating focus on such applications should be useful to better 
understand contemporary China. 
1.3.1 Rationale of thesis 
According to Tai (2006) “We need to look at how the Internet has affected the life of ordinary 
Chinese citizens to understand the cyber revolution that is taking place in China (Tai 2006: 
287)”. By venturing out on a quest into the myriads of expressions in the Chinese 
microblogging sphere, is what this thesis aims to do. The data material used to highlight the 
questions proposed for this study are accessible from within online China. By basing the 
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following analysis on data that is widely available both within the limits of the censored 
Chinese online sphere, and also outside, I hope to emphasize in what way, if in any, the 
popular rise of a new communal space, Chinese microblogging tools, has affected the greater 
online sphere in current-day China, and under what conditions participants of such spaces 
generate content.  
1.3.2 Research questions 
First of all this thesis seeks to explore how a Chinese microblogging application like Sina 
Weibo separates itself or compliments other aspects of online China, asking:  
1) How do Chinese microblogging applications position themselves within the greater online 
space of China?  
Secondly, as microblogging can be regarded as a vessel for personal expression and a tool for 
communication with others, this project adds to the existing discussion of characteristics (or 
lack thereof) of a Chinese public sphere, asking: 
2) How does a Chinese microblogging application like Sina Weibo relate to the concept of the 
public sphere?  
Finally, this study seeks to explore how information is spread online within such a content-
regulated environment as online China, by exploring content spread by Chinese Netizens that 
can be found within the infrastructure of microblogging applications:  
 3) What are the main limitations and possibilities that can be identified by exploring the 
facilitated infrastructure of Chinese microblogging applications, and content diffused across 
this infrastructure?” 
1.4 Outline of thesis  
This introduction has presented a rough backdrop, as well as the main research questions and 
rationale of the thesis. Chapter 2 offers a theoretical understanding of the concept of the 
public sphere, which will form the basis for the following analysis. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
somewhat unique context of Internet in China; first some basic statistics of Chinese Netizens 
and Internet use in China are presented, before mechanisms of censorship and control are 
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explained. Also, some of the unique specifics of Chinese Internet culture like the online 
‘army’ Wu Mao Dang, and so-called Human Flesh Searches are introduced, before a brief 
history of Chinese microblogging is offered. Chapter 4 concerns the methodology of the 
project, with reflections on case studies as a methodological approach, as well as reflections 
on archival research, and of observational and content analysis as applied methods. 
Furthermore the chapter addresses methodological questions of ethics of Internet research and 
possible pitfalls with translation of data. A pilot study is presented as a framework for the 
final study, and the research process towards the final analysis is presented- Chapter 5 
continues with the final study of Sina Weibo; an exploration of the infrastructure of Sina 
Weibo discusses basic functions of the appliction, before the findings of a content analysis of 
leaked media directives and Weibo posts regarding the Wenzhou train crash is presented. 
Finally chapter 6 revisits the initial research questions and offers some concluding remarks.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 The public sphere 
The International Encyclopedia of Communication defines the public sphere as “[…] an 
indispensable element of democratic society and the institutional core of democratic decision 
making” (Marcinkowski 2008). The idea of the ‘public’ is closely linked to democratic ideals 
that call for citizen participation in public affairs (Papacharissi: 2002, 10). In schematic terms, 
a functioning public sphere is understood as a constellation of communicative spaces within 
society, that permits the circulation of information, ideas, debates - ideally in an unfettered 
manner - and also the formation of political will, i.e., public opinion (Dahlgren: 2005: 148). 
Searching for a basic understanding and point of departure for further arguments with regards 
to discussion of the public sphere, there really is no scholar more prominent than Jürgen 
Habermas. With works like The Structural Transformation of The Public Sphere (1962; 
1989), Habermas is often found at the very basis for discussion within the discussion of the 
public sphere. Belonging to the tradition of Critical Theory, Habermas developed a substantial 
contribution to the concept of the Public Sphere, defining it first and foremost as “[…] a 
realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Ibid: 
102). The main characteristics within the concepts of ‘public opinion’, ‘the public body’ or 
‘the public sphere’, initially emerged in early capitalism as a specific sphere between state and 
society (Hohendahl and Russian 1974: 46). According to Habermas citizens constitute a 
public body when they are given an opportunity to confer in an unrestricted manner, “[…] 
that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express 
and publish their opinions – about matters of general interest” (Habermas: 1989, 102). Access 
to the public sphere should be guaranteed to all citizens, and the sphere should furthermore 
function as a mediator between society and state. As the participants of the public sphere 
reach consensus through critical discussion, their decisions then ideally would be 
implemented in society by the state. In such a large public body, Habermas highlights the 
media as tools viewed especially suitable for spreading information, and also for influencing 
those who receive the information.  
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Habermas proposes a historically bound and normative understanding of the public sphere, 
which adds emphasis to historical evolution of media under capitalism, as well as insistences 
of unconstrained access to information and the role of discussion among citizens as 
foundation for formation of political opinion (Dahlgren 2005b: 411-12). In so doing, the 
public sphere has “[…] emerged as a useful analytic perspective [for] both the empirical and 
the normative sense of the media from a standpoint of democratic ideals” (Dahlgren 2005b: 
411). So useful has the concept been, that it has been debated and criticized by scholars across 
a variety of discipline and research interests (see Calhoun 1997).   
Starting with the conceptualization of the public sphere made by Habermas, critics claim it to 
be somewhat idealized (see Fraser 1990; Papacharissi: 2002); this symbol of democracy has 
been undemocratically organized throughout history, by excluding groups like women or 
those of lower social status, as was also acknowledged by Habermas himself. Adding upon 
this, Fraser (1990) augments for the existence of multiple public spheres, formed by those 
who are excluded by some spheres and included in others, and where a public realm or 
government who represents all these different expressions, never truly has existed.  
This is a valid point of argument based in an initial understanding of Habermas, keeping in 
mind also that he proposed the bourgeois model as a normative ideal. As both critics and 
supporters have noted, Habermas himself did not imply that his was meant to represent the 
only model, indeed there had “always […] been multiple, competing and sometimes 
overlapping public spheres in the arenas of public communication ” (Tai 2006: 50), whereby 
similar structure of communication saw additional subcultures or class specific public spheres 
being based on their own premises (Tai 2006: 184).  
The separation of one all-reaching public sphere into sub-levels are also argued to be a 
theoretical development of the Habermasian model that would serve to nuance an analysis of 
a complicated space like the Chinese online environment. Fraser (1990) argues that from 
virtually the very beginning there was a plurality of competing publics, counter-publics, 
which “[…] contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public, elaborating alternative 
styles of political behavior and alternative norms of public speech” (p.61). In this regard, 
Keane (1995) also offers a valuable distinction within the different types of spaces the public 
sphere might be said to exist of, marked by main dichotomies like ‘private space’ versus 
‘public space’. According to Keane, with spatial frameworks of communication changing, the 
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old dominance of state-structured and territorially bound public life mediated by the 
traditional media channels are changing too (Ibid: 8). The concept of a public sphere thereby 
changes as well, and does not necessarily relate exclusively to the state-protected state media; 
nor are they as Habermas argues per definition tied to the “zone of social life narrowly 
wedged between the world of power and money (state/economy) and the pre-political group 
associations of civil society” (Ibid: 16). The implications of these spaces are that in differing 
degrees the realm of privacy disappears (Ibid: 17), diminishing justifications of any matter as 
‘private’ (Ibid). Furthermore the developments in our increasingly globally intertwined world 
cannot easily be understood from “within the orthodox perspective on the public sphere” 
(Ibid), a problem that is discussed by introducing three sub-levels of public spheres; the 
micro-, meso-, and macro-public spheres. Despite being able to function side by side within 
the same system, the three levels have distinct features. The micro-public sphere reflects 
bottom-up, small-scale locales (Fiske 1993 cited in Keane 1995: 9), where citizens create 
their identities as a counterbalance to top-down power set to regulate public life on a local 
level (Keane 1995: 9). Micro-public spheres like discussion circles, church communities, and 
publishing houses are spaces where citizens could question and transform “the dominant 
codes of everyday life” and counter them with alternative experiences of interpersonal 
relations (Ibid 10). Even though the micro-public spheres appear to be ‘private’ and tucked 
away from official public life and media publicity, they find their main strength in being able 
to operate unhindered in the “[…] nooks and crannies of civil society” (Ibid).  
The meso-public spheres are “[…] those spaces of controversy about power that encompass 
millions of people watching, listening, or reading across vast distances” (Ibid: 11). This level 
of the public sphere is argued to mainly coexist within the nation-state, but might also extend 
their boundaries to audiences with a shared understanding of the sphere, like a common 
understanding of language. Large circulation newspapers such as Le Monde and radio- and 
television channel like BBC are examples of media outlets that could be argued to belong to 
the meso-public spheres, knowing they extend their influence across geographical and cultural 
borders by those understanding French and English, respectively.  
Above the meso-public sphere, there are macro-public spheres of global or regional 
magnitude, fueled by multi-national companies like Time-Warner and Reuters. But perhaps 
one of the single most important developments within this level of public spheres is the 
introduction of the Internet, a network that stimulates the growth of macro-public spheres 
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(Ibid: 14-15). It represent  a politically constructed space that has no immediate connection to 
physical territory, showing how public life presently is undergoing a significant process of de-
territorialization (Ibid 19). 
2.2 Private vs. Public 
In descriptive use, the term ‘public’ is commonly understood as an opposite of ‘private’, in 
the sense that no element can be both public and private, or neither private nor public (Bobbio 
1989: 9). As one of the great dichotomies, an understanding of differences between public and 
private has been dealt with in a variety of disciplines, in both social and historical sciences 
(Ibid: 1). There are however two separate meanings of private and public, the first being 
private understood as something that is ‘non-public’, exemplified by how the terms are 
understood within the laws of private property versus public property, or the entity of family 
as part of a private sphere as opposed to the greater sphere of the public (Ibid: 4).  
The second meaning of public refers to use of the term in meaning of ‘open to the public’ or 
‘performed in front of spectators’, as opposed to private, being something said or done within 
a restricted circle of people, or even in secret (Ibid: 17). As Thompson (1994) describes it, 
“[…] form the mid-sixteenth century on, ‘public’ became increasingly to mean activity or 
authority that was related to or derived from the state, while ‘private’ referred to this activities 
or spheres of life that were excluded or separated from it” (p. 38). A state, characterized by 
“relations of subordination between governors and governed” (Bobbio 1989: 4), represents a 
relationship of inequality, between holder of power and command and those who have to 
obey.  
However, the theoretical distinctions do not necessarily help to separate the realms of public 
and private. Public and private are not self-evident and naturally distinct categories in our 
increasingly globalized world (Sparks 2000: 90). An Olympic sports event is a public event, 
but watching it on television in your living room at home would relate the same event to an 
experience within a private domain. The distinction between private and public are of concern 
for the concept of the public sphere as well, and also for the behavior of Netizens online. 
While the Internet has become part of our public life, and subjected to laws regulating public 
behavior, online activities could still be regarded as belonging to our private domain. Social 
gaming at an Internet café would be an example of an online activity of a public character, but 
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you are still also within a somewhat private domain as you most likely would sit in front of 
your computer alone. Posting a message to your Facebook-wall that only your own personal 
network of friends can see is online activity restricted to a more private realm that you 
yourself define the boundaries of, while posting the same post for all your millions of 
potential Weibo-fans to see, relates a very similar activity to a greater public. In online spaces, 
the distinctions of public and private, very much comes alive, and could also offer challenges 
on not only an individual level, but also to the greater society.  
2.3 The online public sphere 
In his reflections of a communication model of deliberate politics, Habermas (2006) 
highlights the role of self-regulating media system that is independent of its social 
environment, in a feed-back loop with anonymous audiences who grant feedback between 
informed elite discourse and a responsive civil society (p. 412-413). Politicians and media 
professionals are furthermore seen as essential actors of a political public sphere (Ibid: 416), 
but for the greater part they have been part of a professional arena off-limits to the greater 
public. Starting with the early eighties, the playing field for self-expression and information 
dissemination would change greatly, when the Internet finally would emerge as a particularly 
powerful addition to the mass-media trio of newspapers, radio and television. Along with this 
new and efficient technological innovation, came the expansion of the role of the public in the 
social and political arena (Papacharissi 2002: 10). For some, the Internet represents not only 
new means to promote citizen activism through the mere speed one can gather and spread 
information online, but also the power to bring people together without restrictions of 
geography, and economic inequalities (Ibid: 12).  
It could be argued like Jones (1997 cited in Papacharissi: 2002: 10) that cyberspace functions 
more in lines of, a ‘new public space’, where people join in on the strong modern impulses 
toward self-fulfillment and personal development (Jones 1997 cited in Papacharissi 2002: 11). 
Thereby also meaning that cyberspace as a public space not is synonymous with a public 
sphere; the virtual space enhances discussion, whereas a virtual sphere is understood to 
enhance democracy (Papacharissi 2002: 11). Dahlgren (2005a) notes that the  
[…] impact of the Net on politics is low: use of the Net for political purposes is clearly minor 
compared with other purposes to which it is put. The kinds of interaction taking place can 
only to a small degree be considered manifestations of the public sphere; democratic 
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deliberation is completely overshadowed by consumerism, entertainment, nonpolitical 
networking and chat, and so forth” (p.151).  
Both Papacharissi and Dahlgren argue for the Internet to be some sort of virtual public sphere, 
if not in the strictest normative sense proposed by Habermas, and stressing the point of 
plurality of spheres as opposed to one single sphere. Not all are in agreement with this view, 
Dean (2003) argues forcefully against the Internet as a public sphere in her tellingly titled 
article ‘Why the Net is not a Public Sphere’. Simply adding an ‘s to categorize the various 
conversations, sites and applications online is too simple, the Internet is not a space of 
multiple realities, as there is only one reality, multiple only to the extent that you can choose 
different approaches to handle this one reality (Ibid:106). Following this line of 
argumentation, the Internet takes form as a ‘zero institution’, and a particularly powerful one, 
as she writes: “its basic elements seem a paradoxical combination of singularity and 
collectivity, collision and convergence. It brings together both the unity and the split, both 
hope and the antagonism, the imaginary and the Real in one site” (Ibid: 106).  
The Internet might however be more apt in meeting demands of the normative models of a 
public sphere, singular or plural, to a greater extent than the traditional media of press and 
broadcast. Traditional media, even global actors like CNN and Financial Times, are still 
rooted within its country of origin, and even though being available on a global scale, these 
examples nevertheless fundamentally still cater to mainly English speaking elite audiences 
(Sparks 2000: 79). Press and broadcast mediums on both global and local levels are also 
restricted by various kinds of censorship, as well as limitations set by concentrations of 
ownership, market forces and would in many instances also hold a dependence upon revenue 
(Ibid 78). Genuine access for the larger population to press and broadcast mediums are 
limited even within the most democratic of countries, further challenging the medias position 
as representatives of the public sphere (Ibid: 78). The basic foundation of the Internet differs 
from the traditional media by a design of transparent protocols that in principle are global, and 
an interactive communication model with reduced entry barriers, which also produces 
information that is easy to store and diffuse (Ibid: 79-80).  
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2.4 The off- and online public sphere in China 
For communist states, the normative ideal of negotiations between leaders and the public 
takes on a quite different form than the notions found in the Habermasian model. The 
Marxist-Leninist position contends an “almost perfect congruence” between leadership policy 
and mass opinion, making investigations into public opinion redundant (Lagerkvist 2010: 
164).  Opposition and deviance were to be quelled, so as not to intervene with the official 
public sphere, as it was portrayed by the state (Ibid). Like early modern Europe, Late Imperial 
China experienced a greater volume of long-distance trade, developed a more distinctive 
urban culture in forms of teahouses, and saw an expansion of literacy and circulation of often 
quite critical literature, followed by an intensification of change in the latter half of the 19th 
century (Rowe 1990: 314-315). Furthermore China saw city-politics take on a ”life and logic 
on its own as opportunities to engage in political discussion and action expanded” (Strand 
1989 cited in Rowe 1990: 323). Rankin (1993) argued that even though the details of 
Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere hardly could be applied to Chinese society, the embedded 
negotiations nevertheless had value for understanding the realms and relationship between 
state and populace in non-democratic China as well:  
Such spheres require a state presence, a degree of autonomous or voluntary social involvement, 
some social impact on policy, and a legitimizing idea of the common good. They are 
distinguished both from direct state administration or coercive control and from private spheres, 
particularly of family or other kin groups but also of individual businesses, apolitical friendship 
networks, and other activities that do not concern matters of common interest (p. 160). 
 
However, as with other socialist states, downplaying political mass-influence could be viewed 
as a source of stability (Lagerkvist 2010: 165). Indeed, social stability as foundation for 
economic reform has been one of the most central notions for Chinese Party-leaders after 
Deng Xiaoping, who while serving as paramount leader of China from 1978 to 1992, 
introduced ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (A3./C<) as a platform for 
substantial economic reform that saw continuous importance for Chinese development into 
the post-Deng eras as a well (Lagerkvist 2010: 165). The mass-mobilization on Tiananmen 
Square in 1989, and the renewed awareness of public opinion gained by Chinese leaders after 
the crack-down on the student led protest, has been followed by concepts like ‘supervision by 
public opinion’ / ‘public supervision’ (­¸) (Lagerkvist 2010:166) and ‘guidance of 
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public opinion’ (­¸V;) 2 to be incorporated into official political discourse. Investigative 
journalism (see Tong and Sparks 2009), as well as popular online activities like blogging (see 
Lagerkvist 2010) has also lead to a renewed appreciation for concepts relating to the public 
sphere, perhaps favoring a more neutral-sounding terminology of a public space, as a 
theoretical basis for understanding negotiations of power and influence in modern China.  
 
When discussing online reality in China, debate amongst scholars is generally divided along 
two main lines of argumentation. Within the first, the Internet is regarded as a positive force 
promoting self-expression, democratization and increased personal freedom, where the 
second line offers a more pessimistic view, arguing that the positive effects are grossly 
overrated, and that the Internet might in fact have negative effect on Chinese society as it 
might just as well facilitate surveillance and promote isolation (for balanced reflections of 
perspectives see i.e.Tai 2006; Zhou 2006; Zheng 2008; Yang 2009; Lagerkvist 2010; 
MacKinnon 2012). The positive views on Chinese online spaces would favor arguments of 
development towards civil society and a public sphere as facilitated by the Internet, while the 
more negative consequences of Internet use in China would seem to greatly restrict such 
developments. In this regard, Lagerkvist (2006) makes an important methodological point in 
trying to avoid technological determinism, by arguing that “Information technology like the 
Internet cannot, in and of itself, revolutionize authoritarian countries such as China into 
becoming a pluralist democracy, for the simple reason that the technology has no self “, and 
also that “[…] technological innovations can become powerful tools with the potential to 
generate significant social change, provided that human beings act and make use of that 
potential (Ibid: 22). Even within the one-party structure of Chinese society, the Internet and 
microblogging platforms offer means for communication and large-scale information 
diffusion. However, what influence or meaning such online spaces add to the development of 
society is dependent of how Netizens as well as the authorities apply the technology. 
Lagerkvist proposes a view of the Chinese online space as an uneasy ‘social contract’ (Ibid: 
39); as long as Chinese Netizens constitutional right to free speech online, as stated in the 
Internet White Paper of 20103, remains subdued by regulations and censorship, Rousseau’s 
                                                
2 ‘Guidance of Public Opinion (­¸V;)’. China Media Project. Available at 
http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/10/05/423/ (Last accessed 29.11.12)) 
3 In June 2010, the Information Office of the State Council, published a White Paper on the current state and 
status of Internet in China, as well as implications for the future. The White Paper stipulates freedom of “privacy 
and correspondence” for all citizens, but also stated intentions to regulate, censor and control the Chinese 
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ideals of a ‘contract social’ hardly applies, but has instead resulted in a “mutual 
embeddedness and strategic negotiation between state and society” (Ibid: 266).  
Moving past the technology itself, but still following the lines of a optimistic / pessimistic 
argumentation, Chinese Netizens are on the one hand seen to be in opposition to authoritarian 
exertion of censorship and control, and argued to produce forces that pushes towards greater 
online freedom (MacKinnon 2012). On the other hand, however, we find arguments that 
whatever freedoms Chinese Netizens might enjoy online, are not a result of the Chinese 
governments failed attempts to control rebellious Netizens and oppositional online content, 
but rather based in whatever level of freedom that has been granted Chinese Netizens by the 
government (Herold 2011a: 2). Also, within the Chinese borders, part of reasoning for strict 
online content control is argued in a basis for caution against influence of foreign-produced 
information, where the borders of the Chinese cyber sphere must be protected and guarded 
from foreign influence to protect China’s information space and ideology, achieved by 
filtering and blocking of harmful content, and by actively influencing people’s thought 
patterns (Hui and Huang cited in Lagerkvist 2006: 58). Following this train of thoughts 
arguments from Chinese academia argue that the Chinese party-state’s propaganda apparatus 
has lost grounds in the world’s new information order, resulting in challenges to defend 
socialist ideology online in the face of hostile Western powers (Li and Wang cited in 
Lagerkvist 2006: 58). Online China is still very much in a state of flux; content providers 
offers Netizens an array of applications, Netizens put them to use, and the government seeks 
to restrict them when deemed necessary by an increasingly smart arsenal of control and 
censorship mechanisms. Characteristics like personal convictions, political ideology, power 
structures and nationalism, are intertwined within these negotiations, adding complexity on 





                                                                                                                                                   
Internet. The White Paper is available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm 
(last visited 29.11.12) 
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2.5 Applying a public sphere framework 
Dahlgren (2005a) proposes a conceptualization of the Public Sphere, constituting of three 
dimensions. The structural dimension closes in on formal institution features; the media 
organizations, their political economy, as well as control, regulation and ownership and legal 
features (Ibid: 148-149). The representational dimension refers to the output of media raising 
issues of “fairness, accuracy, completeness, pluralism of views, agenda setting, ideological 
tendencies, modes of address, and so forth” (Ibid: 149). Finally the dimension of interaction, 
draws upon both Habermas (1989) and also Dewey (1954), who argue for a “discursive 
interactional process” of the public (Dahlgren 2005a: 149). The dimension of interaction is 
two-fold; first it has to do with how citizens encounter the media; how they communicate and 
make sense of content, as well as apply output; and secondly the interaction between the 
citizens themselves, that would range from face-to-face interaction between two people to 
large meetings (Ibid).  
This conceptualization of a public sphere framework will, together with the main theoretical 
points of Keane’ three levels of public spheres, re-emerge as part of the following analysis. In 
addition to a well-founded theoretical framework, a contextualization of main issues that will 
be discussed are in place, especially when aiming to understand a media landscape that is as 
complex and rich as the Chinese one.  
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3 Exploring ‘Chinanet’ 
The first computer network was set up in China in 1987, but during the early stages of 
Internet development in China, access were limited to scientists, researchers and university 
faculty in metropolitan areas (Zhou 2006: 136). Access became more widely available when 
China Telecom entered the Internet service provider market, with Internet connected citizens 
rising from 3000 to 40.000 over a timeframe of only four months in 1995 (ibid.) 
The soaring economic boom that followed political reforms of the late 1970s, closely linked 
to a focus on technology as a key to socio-economical development (see Zheng 2007), 
eventually brought on the full force of an information revolution and an explosive 
development of Internet-use in China. Influential leaders Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin 
both stressed development of information infrastructure as an integral part of modernization, 
but the eager willingness by the Chinese authorities to develop information technology is 
ofteh lost within a discourse of control and censorship (Zhou 2006: 137), The focus on control 
is however hard to ignore; being an authoritarian state, controlled by the ruling CCP, 
information control has always been of importance. Tensions between government control, 
self-censorship and citizens opinion, highlight the Chinese Internet sphere as a contrast-driven 
space of interaction and negotiation, with a continuously steady growth of Internet users 
adding a new and important dimension to the already established Chinese media institutions.  
In most countries, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) run their networks in competition with 
each other, regulated only by the legislated oversight by their respective governments (Herold 
2011a: 2). In China, however, the state or state-controlled entities own the physical backbone 
of the Internet, from which privately held companies rent bandwidth (Ibid). This means that 
the Chinese government holds a default position of power and control; when it comes to both 
technological aspects and contents of the Chinese Internet (Ibid).  
Finding reliable statistics on Internet penetration and Internet use in China can be hard, as Kai 
Lukoff (2011), editor of China tech-blog TechRice, puts it: “[…] there are lies, damned lies, 
and Chinese statistics. Take them with a pound of salt”. Still, based on available surveys from 
official organizations, like the state affiliated non-profit organization China Internet Network 
Information center (CNNIC), and the third party monitoring market and audience 
performances online in China, Data Center of China Internet (DCCI), as well as third party 
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companies and blogs, some main characteristics and statistical traits of the Chinese online 
sphere become evident. 
3.1  The Chinese Netizens 
In the annual reports on Internet development put forth by CNNIC since 1997, ‘Internet user’ 
is defined as ‘The Chinese citizens at the age of 6 or above who have used the Internet over 
the last six months’. In 1997 China had 620 thousand Internet users, a number that by the end 
of 2011 had grown to 513 million (CNNIC 2012: 13).  
With 538 million Netizens, China has the highest number of Internet users in the world, 
followed by the US and India with 245 million and 137 users respectively (Internet World 
Stats 2012). Being the worlds’ most populous country, and having undergone a massive 
economic transformation during the same time in history as the Internet has spread, it might 
not be surprising that China tops the list. From 2006 to 2009, an average of 6% new Internet 
users was added to the penetration rate, slowing down to 5% and 4% in 2010 and 2011. The 
Chinese national Internet penetration rate in 2011 reached 38, 3% (CNNIC 2012: 13), which 
in comparison is higher than India, holding a penetration rate of 10,2%, but considerably 
lower than the US with 78, 3% (Internet World Stats 2011)4.  
 
Figure 1 Annual development of Chinese Internet Users, CNNIC (2012) 
                                                
4 The top five countries all have a internet penetration rate over 90%, with Iceland topping the list with 97, 8% penetration 
rate (World Internet Stats, 2011).  
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3.1.1 Who are they? 
Most Chinese Internet users are young (CNNIC 2012; Lagerkvist 2010: 33). In 2011, 55, 9% 
of the Chinese Netizens were male, and over 55% were reported to be aged between twenty 
and thirty-nine years old (CNNIC 2012: 20-21)5. A little more than half of China’s Internet 
population has an educational level of senior high school or above, and students constitute the 
largest occupational group of Chinese Netizens, with 30, 2% (Ibid: 21-22). Nearly 60% has a 
monthly income of 2000 RMB (320 USD) or less, which constitutes half of the national 
monthly income average, reported to be just over 4500 RMB in 2011, according to official 
government numbers (China Briefing 2012).  
China’s main divide within its population is between the urban and rural areas of the country. 
By the end of 2011, the urban population of China for the first time exceeded the rural 
population; 690 million Chinese now reside in urban areas, as opposed to 656 million rural 
residents (Xinhua 2012). The urban / rural divide is striking in online statistics as well; only 
26, 5% of Chinese Internet users are rural residents, with roughly half of non-Internet rural 
residents stating “do not know how to use computer/network” as their reason for not being 
part of the growing Netizen population. It is worth noting however, that also more than 40% 
of non-Internet users in urban areas gave the same answer to the question in the report 
(CNNIC 2012: 24). The significant divide of rural / urban divide of Internet access thereby 
seems to be a question largely of technological know-how. From the numbers presented by 
CNNIC, it would seem that the fifty per cent of the remaining eight hundred million non-
Internet users in China are not offline due to lack of access, but rather because of issues 
relating to grasping the technology itself.  
3.1.2 What do they do online? 
The average Chinese Netizen spent nearly nineteen hours weekly online in 2011 (Ibid: 20), 
with ‘instant messaging’, ‘search engines’ and ‘online music’ topping the list over popular 
Internet applications and activities (Ibid: 33). Online China has a reputation of being vivid 
and active in terms of interaction, communication and debate.  
                                                
5 The statistical report by CNNIC defines Chinese internet users as “Chinese residents, 6 years or above who have been using 
Internet in the past six months” (CNNIC 2012, 11). However, only 1,7% were in 2011 reported to be 10 years old or younger. 
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Figure 2 Utilization ratios of selected Internet applications in 2010 and 2011 (CNNIC 2012) 
As can be seen in figure 2, communicative tools like instant messaging applicationls are 
hugely popular in online China, as are personal publishing applications like blogs. From 2010 
to 2011, however, the use of microblogging applications nearly tripled, with now nearly half 
of the Chinese online population making use of such tools (CNNIC 2012: 42), further adding 
an emphasis for a need to explore and understand such applications.  
3.2 Internet with ‘Chinese Characteristics’ 
As a country that highly values both its rich history and culture, it would only seem natural 
that the Chinese online space also consists of some country specific characteristics. Just like 
Deng Xiaoping described the current Chinese political model as ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’, it makes sense to talk about an online environment with equally curious 
Chinese characteristics. Within the Chinese online sphere, widespread use of censorship and 
methods for content regulation greatly affect the overall user-experience compared to Internet 
spheres in other parts of the world.  
3.2.1 Containing online China 
Even though the Internet is hailed as one of the great open and democratic innovations of our 
time, in principle accessible for all and with an enormous amount of free data available, 
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international online community, containing both governments, ISPs and users, have to 
acknowledge some form of content regulation in accordance to rule of law; blatantly harmful 
content, such as child pornography, is illegal to distribute over the Internet, and issues of 
copyright violations have surfaced in regards to online file sharing. That being said, for 
authoritarian regimes, the Internet proposes an additional set of challenges; one-party states 
are likely to seek means allowing them to maximize control over the Internet (Hachigian, 
2002: 41-42), just like they seek to maximize control over other media outlets. The 
introduction of the Internet in such societies proposes new difficulties in the regimes 
persuasive power, due to traits of anonymity, speed and relative inexpensiveness (Ibid: 42). 
Still, the realm of the Internet offers economic- and developmental opportunities for one-party 
states just as it does for democratic societies, therefore the main problem for authoritarian 
regimes is not how to avoid the Internet gaining influence within the population, but how to 
balance a thriving Internet environment with government policy and interest. During the 
National People’s Congress in March 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao publicly stated that political 
leaders do pay attention to public discussions on the Internet, and that public opinions had 
played an important role in helping the government initiate and modify new policy (Zheng 
2007: 36). Online discussion is however very closely monitored, as Chinese Netizens 
maneuver an online space that is heavily controlled and censored.  
3.2.2 Control and censorship 
The many causes and effects that follow from the complicated interactions between Internet 
users, content providers and authorities are intertwined within a quite unique online space. A 
very simplistic model of online China is provided in Figure 3, in an effort to highlight some of 
the many inter-related connections of use and interest within the space. 
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Figure 3 A simplified model of online China / ‘Chinanet’ 
The most distinct feature of the Chinese online space is the Golden Shield project. Introduced 
in 1998, and owned by the Ministry of Public Security, the project encompasses significant 
recourses to monitor online activity (Farrall and Herold 2011: 173). The project also includes 
the so-called Great Firewall of China, one of the most visible and direct forms of censorship. 
The Great Firewall consists of several virtual walls that operate across the entire space of the 
Chinese Internet (Lagerkvist 2010: 32), and effectively filters content from the greater online 
sphere from being accessible in China. Part of the reasoning for the Golden Shield and the 
Great Firewall is protecting the Chinese population from violent and pornographic content. 
However, results for a non-explicit but yet (in China) politically sensitive keyword like 
‘Tiananmen 1989’ will produce very different results using a internationally popular search 
engine like google.com and the Chinese market leader baidu.com; a picture-search using 
Google offers results like the iconic picture of the man standing still with a bag in his hand, 
body-blocking a procession of tanks, and picture of casualties after the crack-down on the 
protesters6. A picture-search on baidu.com using the same keyword in Chinese (5& 1989) 
gives results of pictures of US president George Bush visiting Tiananmen square in February 
1989, and pictures of parades7 in addition to a message reading “According to relevant laws, 
                                                
6 Google search (google.com) 26.11.12 using the keyword “Tiananmen 1989”.  
7 Baidu search (baidu.com) 26.11.12 using the keyword“5&1989”. 
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regulations and policies, some search results are not displayed”8. Also, blogging applications 
like blogspot.com, as well as social networking applications Facebook, Twitter and YouTube 
are entirely blocked by the Firewall, as are sites belonging to the organization Human Rights 
Watch, as well as parts of bbc.co.uk – to name but a few. Some Chinese Netizens will 
however use circumvention software like Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and proxy servers 
to maneuver around the technical shield that covers the Chinese online sphere. Nevertheless, 
both Netizens who use such circumvention tools, and those who do not, are basically part of 
the same restricted basis the domestic Chinese online space sets for them. If your VPN is out 
of order your search for information is limited to what regulated content you are offered. The 
government demonstrated a very direct power over the infrastructure of online China, when 
after incidents of social unrest, Internet access was seemingly shut down entirely for months 
in the province of Xinjiang in 2009 (Hogg 2010; Lam 2010)9, and also in the village of 
Wukan in December 2011 (IFEX 2011). In addition to these very technical measures of 
censorship, various directives are issued to regulate the form and sentiments of content in 
online China. From the authorities point of view, incentives for implementing online 
regulations, both severe technical efforts like those in Xinjiang and Wukan, and also the more 
‘everyday’ content regulating restrictions, are explained from a political desire to maintain 
control over information, using official rhetoric, as a means to secure stability and a 
‘harmonious’ society. For ISPs and content providers, the incentive to implement government 
regulations might be more in lines of fear of punishment by the government10, where a 
possible loss of valuable market shares in case of a shut-down would create an incentive of 
self-censorship in fear of government reprimands.   
Although the Great Firewall blocks many Chinese Netizens from accessing international web 
sites, it does not block international users from accessing the Chinese online space. The Great 
                                                
8 In Chinese: t¶ū|cÛcƧ3/gıĴªŗƑŨĥ
9 Government institutes, like police and communication departments remained connected (Lam 2010). 
10 In a 2012 financial statement Sina states that as they have yet to fully implement a governemtn demand of 
real-name registraion to their full Weibo-service user base, the company fear they now face “[…] potentially 
severe punishment by the Chinese government”. (Sina, 2012. “Annual Report Pursuant To Section 13 or 
15(d) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934”. United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094005/000110465912030028/a12-
7070_120f.htm#Signatures_102025 (Last accessed 29.11.12) . 
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Firewall therefore functions mostly as a one-way blockade. In restricting international access 
for Chinese Netizens, but allowing international Netizens to access the content regulated 
Chinese Internet space, the presence of international Netizens punches breathing holes in to 
the argumentation of the Chinese online environment as a space of total isolation, as a fully 
contained Intranet. In regards to Sina Weibo, non-Chinese organizations like the New York 
Times, and celebrities like Tom Cruise, are registered Sina Weibo users. However, full use of 
Sina Weibo as a communications tool and information channel is somewhat restricted for 
users without knowledge of the Chinese language; posts in English might receive comments, 
and will be reposted by other Sina Weibo users, but with a user-pool that greatly favors posts 
in Chinese, the pay-offs of receiving information from the feeds of other users, as well 
information provided by Sina Weibo itself, is limited for those who do not understand the 
language.  
3.2.3 Media Directives  
A further complicating factor of the Chinese online space compared to the greater 
international online spaces, are the presence of government directives. All media outlets are 
subjected to content regulating directives issued by official government agencies, and at times 
also local level departments. Two of the most active bodies of media control are the CCP’s 
Central Propaganda Department (CPD), enforcing the party line for the greater Chinese media 
sphere, and the Information Office of the State Council (SCIO), more actively covering the 
Chinese online sphere11. The directives generally instruct media outlets how to frame 
incidents, or to not report on an incident all together. For an application like Sina Weibo, such 
directives become of a particular interest, as the media organization Sina Weibo is part of the 
content regulated sphere required to implement media directives, while the users of Sina 
Weibo generally would not directly receive any kind of government directives instructing 
them how to express themselves, and therefore Netizens will largely remain unaware of which 
off- and online incidents and issues will develop into a topic deemed sensitive by authorities, 
up unitl the moment Sina Weibo implements content regulating measures like key word 
filtering or deleting posts. 
                                                
11 See China Media Project, Media Dictionary: “Ministry of Truth @# ”. Available at 
http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/03/07/5372/ (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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Media directives issued by government bodies make an interesting point of departure when 
trying to understand the dynamics in play between government and citizens, as the likes of 
Sina Weibo makes fully implementing these directives harder, mainly due to the high 
frequency of Weibo posts and the speed such posts can be diffused. Journalists have also been 
known to use microblogging tools to vent frustration when government directives interferes 
with their profession, with some reporters and editors publishing stories about the Wenzhou 
train crash on their microblogs as they were pulled last-minute from traditional media outlets 
following media regulating directives (Bandurski 2011b). As a result newspapers containing 
white spaces where information should have been published, both giving a very obvious 
statement that an act of censorship had occurred, but also portraying a form of protest by not 
replacing the white spaces with other content.  
From time to time, censorship directions issued by central or local Chinese government 
authorities are leaked online. When leaked, the censorship directions find their way to such 
sites as the bilingual Chinese news site China Digital Times, which has dedicated an own 
portion of their site to such directives, under the tag ‘Ministry of Truth’, in reference to 
George Orwell’s gloomy tale of surveillance and control in his book ‘1984’12. The site is 
blocked by the Great Firewall, and thus unavailable for Chinese Netizens who do not use 
circumvention tools. One of the directives used in this study was initially identified via China 
Digital Times, but was followed by picture with a Sina Weibo logo that showed a mobile 
phone screen with the text of the directive, thereby demonstrating that leaked directives also 
appear inside the Great Firewall13. In general, these media directives are issued across all 
types of the various Chinese media outlets, belonging to both traditional and new media, and 
with some of the directives also directly applying to online media.  
3.2.4 Online monopolization   
In China, a game of Internet Monopoly would put to use a very different board than a 
Monopoly game in Norway, USA or Japan. Dominate positions in terms of market shares in 
relations to online activity like use of search engines; instant messaging and online gaming in 
                                                
12 See China Media Project, Media Dictionary: “Ministry of Truth @#”. Available at 
http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/03/07/5372/ (Last accessed 19.11.12) and China Digital Times, “Tag: Ministry of 
Truth”. Available at http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/ministry-of-truth/ (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
13 For picture of the directive see China Digital Times, Available at 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-wenzhou-high-speed-train-crash/ (Last 
accessed 29.11.12) 
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China are dominated by Chinese content providers as opposed to international content 
providers (Zhong 2012). Numbers from the web information company Alexa showed that in 
2011, eight of the ten most popular web sites internationally, found their origin in the US. 
Tellingly enough, the two sites ruining a total American dominance, were the Chinese search 
engine Baidu, and the Chinese instant messaging service, QQ14.  
 
Returning to the fundamental normative foundations of the internet as a free market, 
development of popular sites like google.com, facebook.com and live.com, might all be seen 
as representing an American domination in lines of Gramsci’ concept of cultural hegemony 
(Lears 1985: 568). Nevertheless, with such a tremendously large number of web sites 
available for anyone with computer access, the will and power of Netizens worldwide to 
choose what sites and what content to access should not be underestimated. For some 
Facebook would appear to be close to indispensable for keeping in touch with international 
friends, pretty much like instant messaging service QQ has positioned itself for those wanting 
to keep in touch with Chinese acquaintances. Whether or not Facebook would have had the 
same potential to grow internationally had it originated in Luxembourg, Iceland, Singapore or 
any other country with a consumer base substantially smaller than US is however a question 
that is worthy of a thought-experiment, but has an answer that lies well beyond the limitations 
of this study. The domination of domestically developed content providers in online China, 
however, is an important key when seeking to understand how the Chinese online space 
functions, and how Chinese Netizens use online spaces for communication.  
Whatever political, economic or cultural ideas the Chinese online Monopoly board might be 
founded upon, some will argue that the dominant positions held by domestic content 
providers, together with an efficient Great Firewall that keeps unwanted content off-limits, 
significantly and drastically isolates China from the greater global online sphere (Zhong 
2012). With a small portion of the overall amount of Chinese Netizens breaching the Great 
Firewall by use of VPN or Porxy servers, as well as a possible preference for Chinese-
language sites, the Chinese Netizens are willingly or unwillingly part of an online space 
where much of the influence over their online reality mainly is domestically rooted, compared 
to the greater international masses of Netizens. Arsène (2012) argues in the opposite direction 
from Zhong (2012), and claims that the argumentation of a Chinese ‘Intranet’ is overrated, 
                                                
14 http://andromida.hubpages.com/hub/most-popular-websites (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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and that quite on the contrary the Chinese are expanding their presence and influence in the 
global Internet ecosystem (Arsène 2012: 1). This might be true in regards to China aiming to 
spread technical- and service based innovations to the global Internet sphere, i.e. with the 
presence of telecommunications company Huawei on the international market, and Sina 
Weibo in 2011 releasing an English interface language option for the mobile version of the 
microblogging application, making it easier for international users to explore the platform 
(Gadgets Republic 2011). Offline China has entered, and made an impact, on the global stage 
as a member of WTO and hosting the summer Olympics in 2008, as well as having “latched 
onto the notion of ‘soft power’” (Saich 2011: 101) to promote Chinese language and culture 
by funding Confucius Institutes, expand CCTV International and increasing their presence 
and aid to Africa (Ibid). Still, being on the outside looking in on online China, instead of 
being on the inside looking out, a language-barrier leaves the population of the global Internet 
sphere with no knowledge in Chinese language fumbling around in a vast forest of unreadable 
characters.  
 
Google and Yahoo! are examples of international companies that have ventured into the 
Chinese market, and that also both have encountered difficulties in their operations, including 
having to compromise on company policies regarding filtering, control and censorship to 
accommodate the Chinese government. In 2005 Yahoo! was widely criticized in accusations 
of helping the Chinese government jail a writer after handing over information withdrawn 
from the writers personal Yahoo! e-mail account to the authorities (MacKinnon 2012: 133). In 
2010, following reported hackings of gmail accounts, the international search-engine giant 
Google relocated from mainland China to Hong Kong in order to reduce the levels of self-
censorhip Internet policy on the mainland demanded (Branigan 2010). 
 
Both Google and Yahoo! still operate in China, trying to secure parts of the huge Internet 
market China offers. The two internationally popular companies do however loose in 
competition with Chinese developed services, with search engine Baidu holding a steady grip 
with a reported 78,6% of the search query market share, with Google coming in second with 
only 16.6%  (China Internet Watch 2012).  
Online monopolization and a containment of the Chinese Internet sphere within the Great 
Firewall can be argued from two separate protectionist fronts; first of all, in order to protect 
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the Chinese market and boost the Chinese Internet industry it makes sense for the party-state 
to hold preference to domestic Internet content providers. Secondly, The Great Firewall does 
not, as previously mentioned, hinder the global Net population to access sites in China, but 
has instead developed a variety of Chinese Internet sites and applications holding a strong 
preference for the their language, thereby effectively reducing influence of millions of non-
Chinese speaking Internet users on the Chinese online space. Therefore, as long as the Great 
Firewall keeps Chinese Netizens contained within the frames the party-state sets for them at 
any given time, it makes sense to argue for the existence of a form of Chinese 
‘cyberisolation’, or a Chinanet. 
3.3 Online culture  
Despite its highly controlled infrastructure, or maybe because of it, the space of Chinese 
Internet has offered grounds for a vivid Internet culture to develop. The online cultural 
phenomena are, together with censorship, monopolization and isolation, vital in an 
understanding of the Chinese Internet. Three of the most noteworthy characteristics of 
Chinese online culture, that also are important in an understanding of Chinese microblogging 
applications, are development of online spoofs and slang as a mode for communication, the 
presence of an ‘army’ of online commentators called the Wu Mao Army, and a sort of online 
justice system, by use of so-called Human Flesh Searches. 
3.3.1 Online Spoofs and Slang as Communication Tools 
As part of a greater online culture of online spoofs, in Chinese called E Gao (jp), the 
Chinese Netizens have developed creative communicative puns in order to subvert censorship 
and control. E gao as a greater cultural phenomenon typically “[…] includes all types of 
audio, visual or textual spoofs, which often takes advantage of the transformative capability 
of digital technology as well as the distribution power of the internet” (Meng: 2011: 34)”.  
Such a transformative creativity has also found a linguistic manifestation in online China, by 
widespread use of homophones in the pronunciation-sensitivity of the Chinese language. Two 
beloved examples are the mythical online creatures the Grass Mud Horse (®Ö), and his 
enemy, the River Crab (²) (Meng 2011: 43; Li 2011). The name Grass Mud Horse sounds 
harmless in its own right, but as a homophone in the Chinese language, the pronunciation 
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resembles the more offensive ‘f*** your mother’. His enemy, The River Crab, has a name 
that by alterations of tone pronunciation resembles ‘Harmonious’, a word that since it was 
introduced as part of the overreaching goal of a ‘Harmonious Society’ by Hu Jintao, has 
become a characteristic of censorship (Meng 2011: 44). Expressions established by use of e 
gao, where elements of entertainment and popular culture phenomena originate and develop 
within Chinese online discourse (Ibid: 34), offers a indication of the sustained creative space 
the Chinese online space has developed in to. Chinese Netizens seemingly thrive in a loud and 
chaotic online space that in many ways bare resemblance to the Bakhtinian ‘carnivale’ 
(Herold 2011a: 11-12), while media professionals remain subdued to official media directives 
that still provide the main frames of messages negotiated by traditional media channels. The 
Chinese Internet is filled with homophones and abbreviations to circumvent online filters and 
moderators. For microblogging tools, use of E Gao is expressed by new homophones added 
more or less on a daily basis, developed to get around censorship mechanisms, and also by e 
gao developed slang expressions being added to the lists of blocked key-words as they are 
discovered by censors.  
3.3.2 The Wu Mao Dang 
The Wu Mao Dang (%), in English known as the Fifty Cent Army, is strongly linked to 
main artery of censorship and control that runs through the Chinese online sphere. With 
online information not always being verified or approved by the CCP, the party-state is 
believed to have employed the Wu Mao Dang to not only monitor online discussion, but also 
to actively post pro-party messages and to attempt to guide online communication (Saich 
2011: 17).  Applied as a strategy of influencing and molding public perception and opinion, 
the authorities reportedly pay members of the Wu Mao Dang five mao, roughly equivalent to 
fifty US cents, for every pro-government comment on online discussion forums, bulletin 
boards, blogs and so forth. The Wu Mao Dang are often hard to identify, as off course not all 
pro-government statement found online necessarily would stem from the keyboard of a Wu 
Mao Dang. However, the Wu Mao Dang has been discusses enough online to secure them at 
least an indirect presence within online applications like Sina Weibo; whenever a Netizen has 
an overtly pro-government sentiment, other Netizens are aware that it could be a member of 
the Wu Mao Dang.  Also, the economic incentive for becoming a Wu Mao Dang would seem 
rather low, you would have to post a lot of comments to make it worthwhile for your savings 
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account, making it reasonable to believe the Wu Mao Dang might have a strong pro-
government sentiment as their ideological starting point, thereby not framing the Wu Mao 
Dang as an army of employed pro-government commentators out to earn a buck, but as a 
concept encompassing nationalistic sentiment of someone who wouldn’t mind making a buck 
by expressing their personal opinions while surfing the Net. The presence of the Wu Mao 
Dang, or speculations of their mere existence, drapes a veil of mistrust over trustworthiness 
and representativeness for Chinese online information, a veil that at times seems hard to lift 
when studying the Chinese online climate. The mistrust towards levels of representativeness 
is also in concern for an application like Sina Weibo, that has become to represent a 
connotation toward more truthful, raw and unhindered expression of the Chinese public’ point 
of view compared to the traditional media outlets (Barboza 2011). 
3.3.3 Rule of the Online Mob 
Another curious trait of importance in relations to information diffusion and the handling of 
available information, and also adding a level regarding distinctions between private and 
public life in China, are the so-called Human Flesh Searches (¦o¢. The searches can 
take on many forms; from identification of the woman who posted a video of killing a small 
kitten by trampling it to death with her stiletto-heeled shoes (China Daily 2006), to “[…] 
piecing together parts of a puzzle that in some cases could lead to political scandal…” 
(Lagerkvist 2010: 264). In so doing the Human Flesh Searches become a “[…] counter-public 
indirectly challenging the public order” (Ibid), an alternative order that not only target 
individual Netizens, but also public entities of local government. 
Some also regard the Human Flesh Searches as an expression of the negotiations of online 
boundaries, rules and limitations in online China, where the offline stability and ‘harmony’ as 
emphasized by the party-state, is faced with greater outside pressure from the greater public 
online, who enjoys greater leeway for criticism online, than offline (Harold 2011b: 128). 
Human Flesh Searches will sometimes not only result in online shaming, but also lead to 
offline consequences; the kitten-killing lady, and also the man filming the act, were 
suspended from their jobs, and animal welfare activists made an example of the incident in 
lobbying for animal protection legislation (Ibid: 133). In 2007 a woman committed suicide, 
after discovering that her husband was having an affair with another woman. She left behind a 
suicide note that her sister later published online, with the sister adding a letter of her own, 
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attacking the cheating husband, alongside providing information like his name, place of work 
and place of residence (Ibid: 132). Netizens tracked down the man and his mistress by using 
the information provided, continuously harassing them, and ultimately resulting in the man 
losing his job (Ibid). The man counter-attacked by suing three Internet sites, as well as a 
friend of the sister who had helped her post his personal information online. The case got 
widespread attention in China during 2008, and one website, as well as the friend of the 
deceased woman’s sister, were sentenced to pay a not very substantial fine, totaling 8000 
RMB, for causing the widowed man emotional distress (Ibid), while the two remaining 
Internet sites were judged innocent. The case shows, that the Chinese court did not condemn 
online posting, and subsequent use of personal information to track down and harass Chinese 
citizens, nor did they rule against any individual Netizens participating in the Human Flesh 
Search, or the Human Flesh Search as a phenomenon in general (Ibid). On occasion, the 
Chinese government has also welcomed and applauded the perseverance of Netizens, and 
encouraged them to continue use of Human Flesh Searches (Ibid: 136). When applied as a 
means to supervise and oppose government officials, and directing attention to various 
problems on a local level, Human Flesh Searches could to a certain extent provide a “[…] 
new form of checks and balances previously missing from Chinese politics” (Ibid: 139). 
However, this collective Netizen action that somewhat resembles a sort of mob-mentality 
driven online court of public law, is obviously flawed; online information is not always to be 
trusted, and innocent people might suffer significantly. As a monitoring kit towards corrupt 
official life, Human Flesh Searches would seem to be a poor substitute for a critical, 
professional and alert media sphere rooted in the traditional media channels, and a reliable 
justice system. Nevertheless, Netizens engage in such searches that also are facilitated by use 
of microblogging platforms, serving as an easily accessible platform with a potential to reach 
a lot of people outside ones own personal network. At the same time, the information 
provided during such searches could compromise the privacy of individual Netizens, where 
misinformation and rumors could spin out of orbit and into offline consequences with 
unknown ramifications, while at the meantime being stored within the infrastructure of the 
application where it might be hard to control or remove properly.  
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3.4 Microblogging 
Alongside blogs, social media and personal websites, microblogs are an expression of 
‘personal publishing’ online (Iskold 2007). With the coding language HTML being out of 
reach for some, and other, more standardized tools for making personal web sites offering 
fewer options in regards to layout and design, blogs offered an easy to use alternative, with 
pre-made templates for layouts, and a low threshold for continuous update of content (Ibid).  
During 2003 and 2004 blogging took off in a major way online, Merriam-Webster even 
declared ‘blog’ as word of the year in 2004 (Kopytoff 2011). Social networking sites like 
MySpace also emerged in 2004, adding a new dimension to public publishing online (Iskold 
2007; Boyd and Ellison 2008: 212). In 2006 Twitter and Facebook launched worldwide, and 
quickly gained prominence across the global Internet sphere. The new social networking sites 
further simplified personal publishing by offering tools for short and media rich messages that 
easily could be diffused across your network of friends, acquaintances and strangers alike.   
Compared to blogs, microblog posts are first and foremost restricted in terms of length; for 
both Twitter and Sina Weibo posts are restricted to 140 characters. Microblog posts are also 
text-based messages found to be enriched with contextual metadata, such as name/username 
of the author, date and time for posting, and sometimes geographical location. While every 
individual microblog may be small in size, and thereby with a more limited information value 
compared to regular blogs with no length limitations, aggregated microblog posts of multiple 
users provide a rich source of time-critical information that can point to events and trends of 
various levels of interest (Lohmann et. al. 2012: 753). The same principles are true for 
microblogging applications in China. Compared to the internationally quite secure position of 
Twitter, the flora and history of Chinese microblogging applications is more complex. Many 
have tried, and many have failed, before finally, in the last couple of years, content providers 
seem to have managed to gain a foothold in the Chinese online space that encompasses 
microblogging applications. 
3.4.1 Chinese Microblogging 
International social media giants, including those dedicated to microblogging, have tried to 
enter the Chinese market. American company Friendster gave the Asian market special 
attention with a Chinese-language update of their service in 2007 (Sloane 2007), and 
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Facebook also launched a Chinese based option of their service in 2008 (Moore 2008), before 
being blocked out of the Chinese market the following year. Without competition from 
Facebook and Twitter, Chinese content providers had an golden opportunity to develop 
services designed for the Chinese market, although they would have to structure their 
operations in accordance with Chinese Internet policy and regulation.  
 
In 2005 Internet entrepreneur Wang Xing launched Xiaonei, a site that later would develop 
into the Facebook clone RenRen, and in 2007 he launched his second site with resemblance to 
a US based service, a Twitter-clone called Fanfou (Epstein 2011a). Fanfou did indeed quickly 
gain a reputation as ‘Chinas’ Twitter’, and reported close to 1 million registered users by 
2009. However, in June 2009, the site was closed for ‘maintenance’ just ahead of the 20th 
anniversary of the mass-protest on Tiananmen square (Tan 2009), and in July 2009 access to 
Fanfou was blocked indefinitely by Chinese authorities after allegedly having played a role 
for allowing online agitators to help stoke violence in upheavals of social unrest in the 
Xinjiang province, home the Chinese Muslim minority Uighurs (Epstein 2011b). In 2010 the 
‘maintenance’ period ended for Fanfou, but by then other microblogging applications like 
Sina Weibo had enjoyed a flying start in its absence (Ibid). 
 
The social media vacuum that followed the absence of Fanfou left the Chinese market open 
for new actors, and in 2009, the already well-established Internet-company Sina, who under 
leadership of CEO Charles Chao, amongst other already hosted a popular blogging service, 
launched a new microblogging application. By successfully inviting and persuading many 
celebrities, sports heroes, intellectuals and opinion leaders to add use of the new 
microblogging application in addition to their existing blog portal, Sina Weibo gained 
prominence in the Chinese Internet market, albeit in fierce competition with Tencent Weibo, 
launched in 2010 by the company that also hosts a massively popular Instant Messaging 
service QQ. Based on their already successful services, the user demographic of Tencent 
Weibo has been described as more orientated towards younger user, drawn from their QQ 
demographic, while Sina Weibo has been described as catering more to a white-collar 
demographic (Lukoff 2011). Whatever application you choose to use, Chinese Netizens are 
clearly drawn towards Chinese microblogging applications; the English-language newspaper 
China Daily, dubbed 2010 the “inaugural year” of Weibo (China Daily 2011), with Tencent 
Weibo reporting 300 million users by the end of 2010, followed by Sina Weibo reporting 250 
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million users and 25 million daily active users. In comparison, Twitter reported 175 million 
users as of March 2011 (Carlson 2011). The question remains, however, for both the Chinese 
and the American microblogging tools, how many of the registers users can be classified as 
active users, and also, how many accounts are zombie-accounts15. Also, in the competitive 
race between Sina and Tencent, it is worth noting that Sina holds the upper hand in regards to 
microblogging, with 56,5 % market share on active use reported to favor Sina Weibo, 
compared to Tencent Weibo with 21,5 %  (Resonance China 2011). Even with the numbers 
reported by the companies who host these Chinese microblogging applications being flawed 
and not completely trustworthy, they still give a solid indication that microblogging has 
caught on in China, adding to the importance for understanding and studying the application 
in itself, as well as what implications they might have for Chinese Netizens and Chinese 
society.   
3.4.2 Sina Weibo 
Sina Weibo finds its technological DNA in the American microblogging tool Twitter. Like 
Twitter, Sina Weibo has a 140-character limit of posts. You can however say much more in 
140 Chinese characters then in 140 characters used to spell out Latin based languages. Sina 
CEO Charles Chao axed an initial plan to build a Facebook-like application in favor of 
developing a microblogging application, with overlaps between the two having some Sina 
employees referring to Sina Weibo as “FaceTwitter” (Lukoff 2011). The nickname is not far 
from the truth; Sina Weibo is first and foremost a social media application for short and 
timely messages, but the stickiness and content richness of the applications has its 
resemblance with social networking applications like Facebook, offering in-site applications 
like online and social gaming, a group buying option and even its own currency.    
As an application within the Golden Shield, Sina Weibo is in a somewhat delicate position; in 
order to keen Netizens happy and content, Sina needs to offer an application that is not only 
easy and attractive to use, but that also allows Netizens to access it as freely and unrestricted 
as possible. Nevertheless, Sina Weibo also needs to operate in compliance with official policy 
and regulations, which at times can be quite intrusive in terms of limitations for expression. 
According to the blog Tea Leaf Nation, rumor has it that half of all Sina Weibo employees are 
                                                
15The term describes user profiles that are made up for various reasons, i.e. to create the impression of having 
more followers than is actually true, or create buzz around a brand etc.  
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there to monitor posts for inappropriate or sensitive content in order to keep the central 
government off its back (Tea Leaf Nation 2012). The methods applied by Sina moderators 
include deleting posts and comments, deleting followers, hiding tweets from viewers, as well 
as blocking accounts and IP addresses (Ibid). But even with such heavy restrictions, Sina 
Weibo reports over 100 million posts being diffused across its infrastructure every day (China 
Internet Watch 2012b). Sina Weibo would not be as important as it has become without the 
millions of people using it; some to post pictures on cute cats, some searching for celebrity 
gossip and some looking to voice concern about Chinese society. Besides use of the 
application by Netizens, the technology implemented in Weibo, the parts and structure of the 
platform, is also of great importance to understand how the microblogging site works, why it 
has become so popular and why it is so important in an overall understanding of modern 
Chinese culture. 
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4 Methodology 
In the hours, days, weeks and months that followed after the tragic train crash in Wenzhou in 
July 2011, posts regarding the crash flooded Sina Weibo to such an extent that it was labeled 
a  “watershed moment” for the microblogging platform (Buckley and Lee 2011). Official 
statements were slow compared to those offered by Netizens, with online reports concerning 
the crash spreading quickly amongst information-hungry Netizens. It was also a matter of 
days, and not hours, before official restrictions concerning posts on the crash were introduced 
to publishers of both traditional and new media. The significant amount of Netizen attention, 
and the absence of limitations set by media directives, are the two main characteristics of the 
Wenzhou train crash that offers grounds for further studying Netizen’ communication relating 
to the accident in seeking insight to the research questions proposed for this project. In order 
to gain in-depth knowledge, a case study approach has been applied as a main methodological 
approach to answer questions of position, possibilities and limitations of Chinese 
microblogging applications. Within the design, posts from Sina Weibo, and also the media 
directives that have been leaked online, has served as easily available sources data that could 
be retrieved to perform a qualitative content analysis of the material. 
A qualitative choice of methodology serves an inquiry of this kind well, as “Qualitative 
research takes context and cases seriously for understanding an issue under study, [...] often 
the case (its history and complexity) is an important context for understanding what is 
studied” (Gibbs 2007, xi), and, as argued by Altheide (1996), aims to “understand the process 
and character of social life and to arrive at meaning and process; we seek to understand types, 
characteristics, and organizational aspects of the documents as social products in their own 
right, as well as what they claim to represent” (p. 42).  
4.1 Case Study as methodological approach 
A case study can be understood as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2009: 18), that has an ultimate goal of uncovering 
patterns and meanings, as well forming a basis for constructions of conclusions, and theory-
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building (Patton and Appelbaum cited in Kohlbacher 2006: par 30)16. As Kohlbacher (2006) 
notes, the definition offered by Yin (2009) shows why case study cannot be considered a 
methodological choice, but rather should be regarded as a research strategy; as a choice of 
what is to be studied. Theoretical orientation and interest in individual cases are more 
defining to case study, then what research methods are used (Kohlbacher 2006: par 16). In 
terms of theory, a case study is also flexible, as it is well suited for in-depth exploration, and 
adaptable towards analytical discoveries that lead into new constructions of theory 
(Kohlbacher 2006: par 20).  
4.2 Designing a case study 
According to Yin (2009: 24) “a research design is the logic that links the data to be collected 
(and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study”. The design is a 
blueprint of the study including factors like what questions to study, what data are relevant, 
what data to collect, and how to analyze the results (Philliber, Schwab and Samsloss 1980 
cited in Yin 2009: 26). A good blueprint, a good design, is without doubt of great value when 
maneuvering in somewhat unfamiliar terrain like the Chinese online sphere.  
Like other research methods, case studies can either be explanatory, exploratory or descriptive 
(Yin 2009: 7-8), and are best suited to answer research questions that aim to figure out ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ as opposed to a more quantitative basis of ‘how many’ (Ibid: 9). This study 
explores how microblogs are positioned in the greater Chinese online sphere, use and 
attributes of Chinese microblogs, as well as how microblogging in China relates to the 
concept of the public sphere. There is a clear exploratory fundament in such questions, and as 
with other exploratory questions, they would favor a methodological approach of case studies, 
histories and experiments, as these are apt in dealing with operational links that need to be 
traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidences (Ibid). However, the case of Sina 
Weibo as an example of Chinese microblogging tools also holds a descriptive factor in choice 
of the Wenzhou train crash as an overall illustration of use, limitations and possibilities. The 
material concerning the crash has been withdrawn directly from Sina Weibo for analysis, but 
has been identified only after the incident itself had taken place. As an example that is in 
close proximity in terms of time, the posts concerning the train crash are archival records, but 
                                                
16 In the article The Use of Qualitative Content Analyis in Case Study Research by Kohlbacher (2006) there are 
no page numbers, the citings from the article therefore refers to paragraphs (par) found in the article.  
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still relating to what could be called a contemporary event. Histories overlap with case studies 
in this aspect; histories are the preferred strategy when there is virtually no access or control, 
dealing with the “dead” past, but when the event in question is a contemporary one, it 
overlaps with case studies (Ibid: 11).  
4.2.1 Linking Research Questions to Data 
This case study is designed as an exploratory single case study, with Sina Weibo as the unit of 
analysis (Ibid: 30), used to describe and explore use of Chinese microblogging applications on 
two levels; first how such a microblogging tool functions within the greater Chinese online 
space, and how it relates to the concept of a public sphere; and second how limitations and 
possibilities for information diffusion can be identified within the application. 
 The event of the Wenzhou train crash serves as a further contextualization within the case, as 
an analytical frame for the actual use of microblogging applications. The rationale for 
choosing a single case as opposed to a multiple case design, that might make a project more 
robust and compelling in terms of evidence (Ibid: 53), is that the train crash constitutes a 
unique case when analyzing microblogging in China; it generated widespread interest, and 
has an abundance of material to offer, an abundance that partly was facilitated by an initial 
lack of official directives to curb Netizens reactions and comments on the accident. As part of 
a strictly controlled media sphere, this also adds to the unique characteristics of the Wenzhou 
train crash. 
The research questions of this study are two-folded. The question of “how do Chinese 
microblogging applications position themselves within the greater online space of China?” as 
well as the question of “how do Chinese microblogging applications relate to the concept of 
the Public Sphere?” are addressed in a more theoretical manner by proposing a simplified 
model of online China understood in lines of contextualizing examples given in Chapter 3, 
before the communicative space of Chinese microblogging, represented by Sina Weibo, are 
analyzed by an observational exploration of the main features and infrastructure this 
microblogging platform offers its users.  
The question of “what are the main limitations and possibilities that can be identified by 
exploring the facilitated infrastructure of Chinese microblogging applications, and content 
diffused across this infrastructure?” expands the limits of a mainly theoretical reflection. To 
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examine these questions, a content analysis of five leaked media directives and 281 
microblogging posts that all relate to the Wenzhou train crash has been conducted. 
Applying Virtual Methodologies – the Internet as a place 
It has been a clear aim for this project to base the analysis in data that is available online, 
preferably data that also would be available from within the Great Fire Wall, in order to best 
examine the conditions for an online public sphere in China, not just from the outside looking 
in. Markham (1998 cited in Markham and Baym 2009: 9) argues that the Internet can be seen 
not only as a tool, but also as a place, and a way of being. The Internet has increasingly 
become more and more intertwined with our everyday lives and activities, which might 
purpose a different approach of research as opposed to regarding the Internet as “a separate 
and automatically virtual sphere” (Hine 2009: 10). The widespread use of smart phones, and 
the possibility to send data using mobile networks, adds emphasis to this argument, as they 
enable you to report the latest happenings from your surroundings, without necessarily being 
restricted to a PC, laptop or a cable modem. The Internet is a place and a space, but it is a 
place and pace that is filled with cultural complexity (Ibid). The amount of data that are left 
behind online, however you choose to access it, is staggering, and offers intriguing 
opportunities for research. It also calls for careful methodological considerations, as online 
studies tend to draw upon a wide variety of research traditions and approaches. 
 The online material and data that has been obtained for this study is identifiable in an online 
environment, an environment that is open for all who 1) have Internet access, and 2) registers 
a Sina Weibo account. There are some important considerations to be made when choosing 
online material as the sole basis for data selection; in order to construct a coherent 
methodology for the following case study, a reflection of applying online data, and the ethical 
considerations that follows, are in place.  
This project is based solely on online data that has been obtained by virtual methodologies, 
that is, data based on either contextual, technological or cultural aspects of the online sphere, 
obtained with methods implemented by and through the Internet (Orgad 2009: 35). As for 
other researchers studying online spaces, the sheer amount of available data for this project 
was overwhelming. The online data found on Sina Weibo is also rich in depth; information is 
provided by use of text as well as photographs and video. In addition, more hidden layers of 
    42 
 
textual meaning cannot be overlooked in the framing of Chinese online spaces as controlled 
and censored. A number of challenges had to be tackled in methodological considerations for 
this study, both in relations to acquiring the most purposeful data, and also for securing an 
exhaustive research design. Both quantitative and qualitative methods could be used within a 
case study, however with qualitative data generally presumed of holding a predominating 
position over quantitative (Kohlbacher 2006: par 16). As mentioned, this project is well suited 
for qualitative analysis as it seeks in-depth understanding of a complex environment. 
Quantitative methods could however also serve the purpose of the research questions stated 
for this project as well, but with limitations of time and resources, the data selection for this 
particular study is applicable for a mainly quantitative approach, first and foremost because 
the data is extremely limited in scope compared to the total amount of data available within 
Sina Weibo. Although qualitative approaches within this limited data selection would exclude 
possibilities for establishing any casual relationships, qualitative analysis could be applied to 
point to trends within the overall environment of Chinese microblogging.  
Case Studies and Documentation 
A unique and important aspect of case study strategy is the unique strength a case study holds 
to “[…] deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews and 
observations…” (Yin 2009:11). The data for this study can be classified as one of the six most 
commonly used sources for evidence when conducting a case study, documentation (Ibid: 
101). While online documentation, posts from Sina Weibo and leaked media directives, are 
vital parts of the following analysis, the content of posts and directives are contextualized by 
an observational exploration of technological features within the Sina Weibo structure. 
The main methodological approach for this project is therefore formulated as a qualitative 
content analysis of online material, but with the data continuously having been gathered 
within a real-life context that bears close links to direct observation (Ibid: 109) or naturalistic 
observation (Bordens and Abbott 2002: 197). 
To fully grasp the intentions of Chinese Netizens use of Sina Weibo, personal interviews 
could have added a layer of clarification to the study, however, the role of Netizens 
themselves, as fundamentally important as they may be for a communicative space like Sina 
Weibo, are not the main concern for this study. Furthermore, the levels of trust needed to 
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obtain answers of value from Chinese Netizens would be hard to obtain as a researcher 
situated outside China, who would have to rely on online correspondence, a form of 
interaction that might not be regarded as secure enough for Chinese Netizens to offer fully 
exhaustive answers to questions of online behavior. As the main objective for this study is to 
examine an online space, it makes sense to stick with online data, and to apply methodology 
rooted in textual analysis.  
There would be a number of ways to identify data from Sina Weibo for textual analysis. One 
would be to gather posts from applications like WeiboScope, a University of Hong Kong 
initiative that scans up to 300.000 Weibo accounts17. However, an exploration of Sina Weibo 
as a communications tool in its own right would be in order to better understand the flow of 
information on the microblogging platform, an understanding that would not be reached by 
scrapping data from applications like WeiboScope. Instead, an exploratory approach with 
observational features has been applied to explore how Sina Weibo facilitates communication, 
as well as offering a point of departure for identification of Sina Weibo posts eligible for 
textual analysis.  
4.2.2 Applied Methodology: Issues and Choices 
According to Orgad (2009), the data any researcher chooses as basis for analysis  
[…] should be collected and generated after solid preparation based on a clear 
rationale; should fit with the question and the context; should convincingly 
support the claims being made; should be used reflexively and be context-
sensitive; and, finally, should be ethically grounded (p. 51) 
Most researchers would agree with this assessment, and it also fits with the overall 
methodological approach of this study of a case study design, which stresses need for solid 
preparation, as well as continuous flexibility during the course of a research project. Orgad 
makes a strong and valid point about contextualization of our offline and online existence 
when she states that “It has become clear that the separation between online and offline 
cannot be sustained. Researchers have consistently argued for the need to frame the online 
both in its own right and in relation to other contexts and realities (Ibid: 37).  
                                                
17 http://research.jmsc.hku.hk/social/search.py/sinaweibo/ (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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A critical point for projects based on online data, especially regarding a wide reaching topic 
the concept of public sphere, is that even though there are hundreds of millions of people 
participating in online conversations every day, there are also hundreds of millions of people 
who do not. The Internet is full of Netizens who do not participate in online conversations or 
voice opinions by online applications. Netizens who read and observe, but nevertheless 
remain passive participants within the online spaces (they might get very verbal on subjects 
that sparked interest online in offline spaces), are excluded as a group from the data collected 
for this project. This is off course is a major drawback for the overall external validity for this 
study, as it will be for any project framed to explore a society consisting of over a billion 
people, half of whom have Internet access. It seems indeed impossible to generalize findings 
across such an extensive population. In this regard, a combination of offline and online data, 
like a supplement of a large scale survey, would have been useful to highlight the nuances of 
the data found online, but this was not an option within reach for this project.  
So how then, would it be possible to contextualize a happening that generated interest 
nationwide in China? According to Sina Weibos own reports, over 300 million registered 
users post 100 million posts every day (China Internet Watch 2012b), and even though these 
number stems from an unaudited report there is little reason to doubt that the total number of 
registered users and posts indeed could be well within six-digit-ranges.. The vast amounts of 
information, situated within this complicated online domain, added incentive for structuring 
the design of this project as a one-case study, with data drawn from a set time frame. Such a 
design approach also align well with archival research (Bordens and Abbott 2002: 206) and 
historiography, adding emphasis to the traits of the Wenzhou train crash as a history traced 
within a infrastructure with archival characteristics.  
By analyzing data that has been indentified in a past event –albeit with a proximity in time 
that frames it as a contemporary event - this study separates itself from other virtual 
methodologies like virtual ethnography (Marshall and Rossman 2011) as data collection has 
not been conducted in real-time. Although being a retrospective study, the exploration of 
archival data identified on Sina Wiebo helps to explore an online space, which in general 
provides a disembodied site where social identities are hidden.. Such an online space creates a 
“[…] possibility of studying the construction of identity solely through texts.” (Ibid:182). 
Online and offline identity is thereby separated; the millions of Weibo posts that relate to the 
Wenzhou train crash would not exist in this particular form without this specific online space 
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to frame them. Naturally, content of posts from Sina Weibo might be discussed offline, or 
online actions facilitated by Sina Weibo might lead to offline consequences of some sort, but 
the application itself exists because of the Internet. Furthermore, I as a researcher have 
separated myself from gathering offline material for research and analysis, and I have not 
directly interacted with any Sina Weibo Netizens; this study is solely based on exploring posts 
from the online space of Sina Weibo, proving to be both time- and cost efficient as compared 
to field studies in China.  
4.2.3 Archival Research 
As a non-experimental research strategy, archival research involves studying existing records 
like historical accounts of events, court records, published research articles, and other types of 
archived information (Bordens and Abbott 2002: 206). Archival research is suitable for 
identifying trends and correlations, but in its descriptive nature, you cannot establish causal 
relationships (Ibid: 206). Also, archives might not be complete, although they do often 
contain an “overwhelming amount of information” (Ibid), as is the case with Sina Weibo. A 
single case focus has helped this study to narrow down and identify material for analysis, 
facilitated in the initial stages of the study by the infrastructure of Sina Weibo offering in-site 
search functions. The leaked directives are also archived material, but not within the Sina 
Weibo infrastructure. They are however retrievable online.  
Material regarding the Wenzhou train crash was withdrawn from Sina Weibo, with text and 
pictures from the different Weibo profiles compiled in computer documents. The text – both 
the original Chinese posts, and a subsequent English translation – as well as pictures, was 
later imported and stored in the qualitative analysis tool HyperResearch for further analysis.  
4.2.4 Qualitative Content analysis 
Content analysis has been stated to be “the longest established method of text analysis among 
the set of empirical methods of social investigation” (Titscher et al. 2000 cited in Kohlbacher 
2006: par 34), but according to Kohlbacher (2006) there still does not seem to “exist a 
homogenous understanding of this method at present” (par 34), although the term originally 
“referred only to those methods that concentrate on directly and clearly quantifiable aspects of 
text content, and as a rule on absolute and relative frequencies of words per text or surface 
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unit” (Titscher et al. 2000, cited in Kohlbacher 2006 par 34). Altheide (1996) separates 
between quantitative content analysis and qualitative document analysis, where a qualitative 
methodological approach could serve particularly useful if the aim of a study is to discover 
new or emergent patterns” (Ibid: 16). Furthermore, Bryman (2004) defines qualitative content 
analysis as  
an approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator in the construction of 
the meaning in texts. There is an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data and 
on recognizing the significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an 
item is being analyzed, and the categories derived from it, appeared (cited in Kohlbacher 
2006: par 41).  
This is however, as Kohlbacher (2006; par 42) also argues, a rather descriptive understanding 
of a general approach to qualitative document analysis. A further understanding of qualitative 
content analysis can be found within the works of influential scholars on the field, like 
Mayring (2000), who amongst other adds emphasis to the importance of systematic and rule-
based analysis, placing categories in the center if analysis, and theory guided analysis (Ibid:  
par 54)18.  
Altheide’ (1996) understanding of qualitative content analysis bears similarities with the 
method of grounded theory, sharing a focus on constant comparison, contrasts and theoretical 
sampling in their approach (Ibid: 17). However, qualitative document analysis is more 
orientated towards concept development, data collection and emergent data analysis than 
grounded theory (Ibid). Furthermore, the aim of grounded theory is to generate testable 
hypotheses as a foundation for theory development, whereas qualitative document analysis is 
more oriented towards clear descriptions, and definitions compatible with the material that is 
gathered (Ibid). This project does not aim to generate hypotheses, but seeks instead to explore 
the spatial characteristics of Chinese microblogging application; qualitative content analysis 
was therefore considered to be a reasonable choice of direction for this particular project.  
Understanding Documents  
On the very basic level, documents are by Altheide (1996) understood as “any symbolic 
representation that can be recorded or retrieved for analysis” (p. 2) and can be studied in order 
to “[…]understand culture – or the process and the array of objects, symbols, and meanings 
                                                
18 In the article Qualitative Content Analysis by Mayring (2000) there are no page numbers, citing from the 
article therefore refers to paragraphs (par) found in the article.  
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that make up a social reality shared by members of a society” (Ibid: 2). Yin (2009) also notes 
that documents must be handled carefully, and not be accepted as “literal recordings of events 
that have taken place” (p.103). Online documentation relating to the Wenzhou train crash is of 
course not in any sense or form exhaustible documentation of every aspect concerning the 
crash and its aftermath. However, online posts are in this instance an example of personal 
expressions and a desire to share information, and do thereby represent a somewhat more 
unique form of documentation as opposed to media reports, or other forms of documentation 
provided by different types of official agencies involved. As a tool for public expression, the 
leaked media directives represent documents that formulate the point of view officially held 
by the authorities, adding a layer of negotiation between the two major fractions within a 
normative understanding of the public sphere; the government and the governed.  
The Process of Qualitative Convent Analysis 
Qualitative content analysis follows recursive and reflexive movements between concept-
development, sampling, analysis and interpretation, where “the aim is to be systematic and 
analytic but not rigid” (Altheide 1996:16). This reflexive movement goes towards constant 
discovery and constant comparison of relevant situations, settings, styles, images, meanings, 
and nuances (Glasser & Strauss 1967 cited in Altheide 1996: 16). This, it would seem, fits the 
nature of a case-analysis of Sina Weibo. However, there are a number of methodological 
choices to be made.  
First of all, the researcher must pursue a specific problem that will be investigated. Altheide 
(1996) argues that “the research problem helps inform the appropriate unit of analysis, or 
which portion or segment of relevant documents will actually be investigated” (p. 24). For 
this project, a lot of time was spent researching the background of the main topic, the use of 
microblogging tools in China. Formulating research questions that where manageable within 
this large topic proved to be an enormous challenge, partly due to the almost unlimited 
possibilities a project within the field of Chinese online studies proposes. Designing a 
methodological approach that is manageable whit such a large amount of available material 
turned out to be both difficult and time-consuming, with research questions changing form 
and scope many times during the course of the project. Media analysis relating to the public 
sphere is well-documented territory, and therefore an additional project within this particular 
field of media studies would need to be fresh and hopefully innovative.  
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With Sina Weibo being both large and somewhat vague for me in my first encounter with the 
application, the approach for category development, both the initial exploration of the 
application itself, as well as the material withdrawn to identify possibilities and limitations, 
was inductive (Mayring 2000: par 8). Within an inductive approach, the main idea is to let 
“themes and categories emerge from the data through the researcher’s careful examination 
and constant comparison” (Zhang and Wildemuth 2009: 1), with a main idea to “formulate a 
criterion for definition, derived from theoretical background and research questions, which 
determines the aspects of the textual material taken into account” (Mayring 2000; par 12). An 
inductive approach has its counterpart in deductive category application, where prior 
formulated and theoretical derived aspects of analysis are brought in connection with the 
analyzed text (Ibid: par 13). In relations to identifying categories and themes, and in line with 
a division between an inductive or deductive approach, Gibbs (2007) also separates between 
concept-driven and data-driven coding (p. 44-45). Concept-driven coding is aided by a pre-set 
list of thematic ideas that the researcher might have generated from previous studies, research 
literature, personal hunches etc. (Ibid), whereas data-driven coding, or open coding as it also 
is called, does not start out with any lists of codes, seeking to set aside any preconception the 
researcher might have, thereby allowing the material to decide the direction for analysis. The 
two approaches are not mutually exclusive, most research moves back and forth between the 
two (Ibid: 46). Having framed this research towards a theoretical emphasis of the public 
sphere, and by integrating leaked media directives into the analysis, there was an underlying 
presumption that the material withdrawn from Sina Weibo would answer the questions of 
possibilities and limitations offered by use of Chinese microblogging applications. However, I 
had no presumptions about the actual content of the posts themselves, other than that they had 
been many, and hopefully varied in terms of opinion. Media reports that were part of the 
initial research stages for designing this project had also mentioned that posts concerning the 
Wenzhou train crash had serving as a watershed moment for the application, indicating that 
Netizens had been critical towards the incident. How this criticism was framed and how 
widespread it was, and if these reports really represented a truthful and balanced picture of 
online attention towards the train crash, was however uncertain.  
The following analysis of the Wenzhou train crash has therefore relied on inductive category-
development. Both the initial stages of research, and the main analysis that followed, has 
overall been data-driven; I entered Sina Weibo with an observational approach, and after 
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having based a design for a study on a theoretical framework concerning the public sphere, 
Sina Weibo posts were withdrawn for further analysis. However, as Gibbs (2007) also notes, 
no one enters a research project without any pre-consisting ideas, as a researcher is both an 
observer of the social world, but also part of that same world (p. 46). By exploring the 
material, and letting the material decide the direction and scope for themes and categories, a 
preliminary set of findings were identified. The initial explorations of Sina Weibo identified 
material that later would be built into the final analysis, and also served to test and develop 
categories and themes that had emerged. These explorations worked as a pilot study for the 
final analysis, complementing the notion that pilot studies are, if not integral, then a highly 
advised part of a case study design (Yin 2009, 94-95).  
4.3 Methodological concerns 
There are several concerns this type of study must consider. How to handle online 
information and careful considerations of issues of privacy are particularly important, as well 
are issues of how a lone researcher can produce a study that reflects the ‘real’ space of 
Chinese microblogging.   
4.3.1 Trustworthiness and Ethics 
Literature discussing qualitative methodology all touch upon the importance of aiming for 
research that is trustworthy and that also holds a high standard in terms of ethical 
considerations in order to protect those involved in the study (see Marshall and Rossman 
2011; Elm 2009). In our technological day and age, new issues of importance in this regards 
arises.  
What constitutes as private information might differ between culture and countries – what is 
regarded private information in Norway might not be regarded as private in China (Elm 2009: 
71). In China, commenting on a person’s weight, or asking about monthly income, is more 
common than it is in Norway. In regards to the train crash in Wenzhou, pictures of wounded 
passengers, and also personal details such as name, age and telephone number where spread 
by Netizens (see also section 5.3.4). Cultural differences in regards to private versus public 
information do however not relieve a researcher of ethical responsibility in protecting 
organizations and individuals the data material is drawn from.  
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The Internet is accessed by individuals for a variety of reasons; getting a transcript form your 
bank would be a personal matter, commenting on a news story in a online paper’s comment 
section – under ones real name or an alias – would be a more public online activity. Some 
Netizens create personal Web sites as a personal space to express their individual views and 
thoughts; others might dedicate blogs to their favorite celebrity, cute baby animals, cooking 
recipes or commentary on a nation’s foreign policy. How individuals choose to apply the vast 
opportunities the Internet offers are completely up to them, they should however be aware 
that regardless of use, be it venting frustrations, offering advice on the perfect steak or 
criticize incompetent politicians, the Internet can be very private, but also extremely public.  
Your email account is personal, as is the emails you receive to the account. You log on by use 
of a password, and most would be worried if a third party would gained access to your email 
correspondence. However, you also use a password to log on to your Twitter account, but 
your posts, or tweets, unless you actively choose to restrict access to them to your followers 
exclusively, will be accessible to the greater Twitter community. If someone gained access to 
your Twitter profile and starting posting in your name it might be more upsetting than 
someone reading your emails. According to Sveningsson, there are different degrees of 
private and public that apply to the online environment (Elm 2009: 75).  
A public online environment is one that is open and free for everybody, with no requirements 
for registration or membership, i.e. open chat rooms or web pages (Ibid). A semi-public 
environment however, is a space that in principle is accessible for everyone with online 
access, but that requires some form of membership and registration, like web communication 
or social networking sites (Ibid). However, within both public and semi-private online spaces, 
there might be private spaces that can be applied for private interaction, as closed rooms 
within chat exemplify (Ibid). 
While open online spaces require no consent, and private spaces do requires consent (Ibid: 
76), the semi-public and semi-private spaces are more blurry in regards to obtaining consent 
for observation (Ibid). Also, content within the space, be it public, semi-public or private, 
might also differ in degree of private and public. Our conceptions of public and private can be 
blurred because both can exist within the same online space (Allen 1996 cited in Elm 2009: 
76). Furthermore, private chat rooms might not only be used to discuss private matters, but 
topics of public interest as well, while others might discuss private matters on publicly 
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available online channels, either by inclination, or in ignorance. In an example of the latter 
from China, a government official and his mistress posted personal messages to one another 
on Sina Weibo, unaware that the entire Weibo community could follow their conversation (Li 
2011). Online users might also not reflect over the fact that silent lurkers could record, 
analyze and publish findings based on their online activities (Eml 2009: 77). What kind of 
online content then, can be considered public enough to be studied without informed consent? 
According to Elm (2009), Thompson (1994) offers guidelines within this shady gray area; 
public content would be content that concerns societal matters, whereas private content 
concerns individuals private lives separated from societal matters (Elm 2009: 80).  
The data used in this study has already been noted to having been generated in its entirety 
from an online environment. By registering an account on weibo.com I gained access to the 
online space of Sina Weibo, where posts regarding the Wenzhou train crash were identified. 
As a microblogging tool, Sina Weibo is structured around a core of communication. Unlike 
Facebook and Twitter, who offers a choice to openly share their profiles or not, all Sina 
Weibo profiles are open to all Sina Weibo users. The platform in itself is thereby a semi-
private application. The content on the platform, - the expressed, shared and observed 
opinions on Sina Weibo - range from private (unwillingly exemplified by the exchange of 
sentiments between the government-official and his mistress), to conversations on public 
matters like sports scores, national news stories and general politics. The data gathered for 
this study cuts across a vertical slice of the Chinese online sphere; posts are gathered from 
profiles representing official bodies (like government and police); semi-official organizations, 
giving an impression of larger body representation (see also section 4.3.3); media 
organizations; media professionals; opinion leaders; and private profiles, that is, profiles 
without clear affiliation to any of the above-mentioned categories. The categories of media 
professionals, opinion leaders and private profiles are the most vulnerable group in terms of 
ethics for this project, as they all are represented by individuals as opposed to groups without 
one distinct sender behind the produced posts. Within these individual voices, the posts 
posted by media professionals and opinion leaders do however position themselves as more 
public statements than posts posted by Netizens belonging to the private category. All posts, 
however, regardless of their senders, concern a matter of major public interest; the Wenzhou 
train crash. The accident was of public importance and of public concern, and sparked 
discussion of public interest on a variety of issues. Personal opinions might have been 
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expressed, but they all related to a public matter. As will be discussed in the analysis, there 
were however themes of interest relating to the crash that was of a more private manner, like 
personal stories of individual passengers on the train (see also section 5.3.4). 
Marshall and Rossman (2011) cautions researchers to not be fooled by the apparent openness 
of public material, as use of such materials might still be able to harm organizations or 
individuals in ways not anticipated by the researcher (p. 162, 183). Due to the open nature of 
Sina Weibo, and more importantly due to the overall public interest in the case studied, I have 
not obtained consent from Weibo Netizens to subject their posts for analysis, The reason for 
also including a category of private profile follows from the overall ‘publicness’ of the case 
studied. On Sina Weibo, the playing fields for voicing opinions between levels of society 
evens out; the infrastructure of Sina Weibo are same to all whether you are part of a public 
body or represent your own personal voice. The majority of posts that are referred to in the 
analysis are all still available on Sina Weibo. There are however some posts that were 
identified during the course of the study that since has been removed, posts that either have 
been removed by Weibo users themselves, or perhaps also by moderators on basis of content 
in the posts. Such posts are referred to in the analysis only when they highlight important 
aspects for analysis, and the senders of such posts are made anonymous.   
4.3.2 Translations 
When data is transcribed or translated, it is no longer raw data, but ‘processed data’ (Wengraf 
2001cited in Marshall and Rossman 2011: 164). Translating involves subtle meanings and 
connotations (Ibid: 165), and becomes especially complicated to work around when the 
original language of the posts is as culturally complex as Chinese. Chinese online culture 
involves both sarcasm and slang that originated in the vivid Chinese language (Meng 2011). 
As a student of the Chinese language I have a basic, but still unfortunately very limited, 
understanding of such subtleties. The major themes of Weibo posts are comprehensible by 
applying existing knowledge, and a dictionary when in need, but underlying meanings might 
completely be lost in my crude understanding. The data presented here has therefore been 
translated into English by help of two native Chinese speakers, making my own 
understanding, supplemented by additional translation by a native speaker of Chinese, the 
foundation for the analysis in Chapter 5. As part of the Chinese-language specific portions of 
this study is to explore the infrastructure of Sina Weibo, as well as overreaching themes in 
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regards to the Wenzhou train crash, such an approach to handling struggles with language 
would seem sufficient. There is however also a more complicated portion of the research 
questions in the language-specific aspect aimed at highlighting possibilities and limitations of 
posts in negotiation with censorship mechanisms, As this project is an archival study, based 
on observations only after the Wenzhou train crash, there is a great possibility that posts that I 
have identified in relation to the crash first could have undergone an initial interpretation, by 
Sina Weibo, either allowing the post to spread via the application, or removing it. Only after 
such an initial interpretation would I have come across the post in my own exploration of Sina 
Weibo, before the post would have undergone a second interpretation by being gathered, 
translated and analyzed in this project. Posts with content that would seem to push towards 
the limits set by content regulating directives might therefore be understood to be 
controversial based on both my initial understanding, and also the final translation, but this is 
still nevertheless an interpretation of content. Such multi-levels of interpretation, which in a 
possible removal of posts by Sina Weibo also adds to concerns of completeness of the 
application as an archive, offers challenges of the overall completeness for this research 
project. It would however be difficult to secure a complete and exhaustive understanding of 
Sina Weibo while content is open for interpretation on so many levels; first by who-ever posts 
a Weibo post, then by other users of Sina Weibo, and possibly a moderator of content, before 
possibly removed by moderators, or the person who posted the Weibo posts in the first place, 
before finally might being interpreted by someone outside China with limited knowledge to 
all the cultural specific aspects of the Weibo post. 
4.3.3 Concerns of quality 
Quantitative methodologies have developed a variety of approaches and techniques in order to 
ensure that research is true and accurate, consistent across circumstances and applicable to a 
greater whole (Gibbs 2007: 91). Qualitative research, being reflective and interpretive in 
nature, will often fall short in reaching goals of validity, reliability and generalization that 
quantitative research aim to fulfill. Qualitative research stands at risk for being biased and 
partial towards methods applied, and the yielded results, and should therefore strive to 
produce as high-quality projects as possible (Ibid). As a researcher I have done my utmost to 
stay aware of personal views and inclinations that could color my analysis of Sina Weibo. My 
view of the world has been molded by years of Norwegian education, and my mindset clearly 
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belongs to Western European modernity. My existing mindset was however challenged when 
I from 2007 to 2010 altogether spent just over a year and a half in China, studying the 
language and culture, and engaging in discussion of all things Chinese with Chinese and expat 
friends. The complexity of the Chinese society is difficult to grasp from the outside, and 
remains puzzling in many regards also after having gained some insight to it. This project 
emerged from my interest in Chinese society and politics, and the questions asked also stem 
from my whatever knowledge, misconceptions and curiosity I have gained from my studies as 
a student of media and communication with a special interest for China. The reflections and 
answers I give to the questions are hopefully not tainted by my own beliefs, as I have 
certainly tried to stay aware of any biases in any direction or form. The analysis of how 
information travels on Sina Weibo by analyzing the infrastructure of the application is at no 
greater risk for being subjected to personal beliefs, and with posts from Sina Weibo being 
translated by a native Chinese speaker before being subjected to analysis, a thorough basis for 
a balanced view is believed to be achieved within the limitations a MA project sets in terms of 
resources.   
Constant comparison of codes and coded material (Ibid: 96) has been another important 
guideline for this study. Overlapping codes and coding has been a constant concern for this 
analysis, but even with a rigorous coding regime, there is no escaping that accuracy and 
validity of this type of project is a major issue. Also, with the small and limited dataset 
applied in this study, it is not possible to generalize results to the all the different Chinese 
microblogging tools.  
But even with these concerns, Sina Weibo is argued to be a good point of departure for 
understanding the main traits of Chinese microblogging applications as part of the greater 
online China. The Wenzhou trains crash, sparking public outrage and generating millions of 
Sina Weibo posts, furthermore represents uniqueness in magnitude within the Chinese online 
sphere that justifies a single-case approach.   
4.4 Getting Familiar with Sina Weibo 
The pulse of Sina Weibo is extremely fast moving, with Netizens focusing in on new stories 
pretty much every single day. Some stories do however maintain interest over time, gaining 
attention from a variety of microblogging Netizens, including both opinion leaders, celebrities 
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and government-affiliated profiles, and profiled belonging to the greater public. In 2011 such 
stories included a Chinese actress becoming the focus of attention for re-posting anti-gay 
sentiments on her Sina Weibo profile, and a following criticism of her online action 
broadcasted by a presenter on the state-controlled station CCTV (Tan 2011), as well as a 
longer-running campaign aimed at identifying missing Chinese children suspected to be 
kidnapped by human traffickers, initiated on Sina Weibo by scholar Yu Jianrong in early 
201119. The campaign-initiative made the round-up list of Sina Weibo’s bigges stories of 
201120, as did a story that unfolded in June 2011, when a twenty-something young woman by 
the name Guo Meimei sparked Weibo outrage, initiated by a Sina Weibo user commenting on 
her profile listing “Business General Manager of Red Cross Society” as her employment 
details, accompanied by a string of photos of fancy cars, expensive handbags and first-class 
plane rides. Hundreds and thousands of comments started pouring in her Weibo profile, 
turning the story into a trending topic on Sina Weibo, as well as being reported in offline 
media (CCTV 2011). Tracking the story of Guo Meimei served as my first more thorough 
familiarization with the Sina Weibo interface and structure, occurring shortly after I had 
registered my own Sina Weibo account. This initial introduction to Sina Weibo eased my 
introduction to the case that will be subjected for a more thorough analysis; the Wenzhou 
train crash. 
4.4.1 The Wenzhou train crash as a single case 
On the evening of July 23 a Netizen posted a plea for help by use of her Sina Weibo profile  
Please help! The high speed train D301 has derailed not far from the Wenzhou South 
station. All the children are crying in the train. And there is no working staff to help us. 
Please come and help us! (Posted July 23, 20:47,21)  
The message was posted after two high-speed trains had collided on a viaduct just outside 
Wenzhou in the eastern province of Zhejiang. Train D3115, travelling from Hangzhou to 
Fuzhou, came to a standstill on a viaduct, and was shortly after rear-ended by train D301, a 
derivative of the Japanese Shinkansen ‘Bullet Train’, running at 99km/h from Beijing to 
Fuzhou. The impact resulted in the derailing of six train cars, with four of them falling off the 
                                                
19 http://www.weibo.com/jiejiuqier (Last accessed 29.11.12)  
20 http://tech.sina.com.cn/z/2011pandian/ (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
21 Posts has since been removed, original: t1¿D301A¨ÀA¾Y4ÄEA¿7ËM
K?DyZ"=+|etk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viaduct. In the following days millions of posts relating to the crash were posted online, a 
great amount of them flooding the channels of Sina Weibo as well. 
China has spent enormous resources on developing high-speed train connections across the 
country. As with other grand-scale projects, like the Three Gorges Damn, the development of 
high-speed train rails in China has been part of the emerging image that China processes both 
economic and political will to establish itself as a modern, technological highly developed 
one-party state based on the capitalist-friendly one-size-fits-all ideology of ‘Socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’ introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. The development of 
high-speed trains and rails is not only a high-prestige, and incredibly costly project for the 
Chinese state; trains are also a much preferred, and perhaps also the only economical 
available, means of transportation, for millions of Chinese. Consequently, development of 
such projects, as well as complications they might encounter, are topics of great interest for 
the Chinese public. Compared to the enormous natural catastrophe of the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake, where over sixty thousand people lost their lives, the forty lives lost in the 
Wenzhou train crash, compared in nothing else than cynical numbers, comes across as 
marginal. Understandably, the train crash caused public outrage on a massive scale, both on 
communication platforms like Sina Weibo, and also in traditional media channels like 
newspapers and state controlled television station CCTV22. Adding to the complexity of the 
circumstances surrounding the train crash, online mechanisms of censorship did not kick in 
with full force during the evening of the crash, nor did it in the following aftermath. In the 
days following the crash, media outlets were told to refrain from investigation and 
commentary, but online information, opinion and speculations floated more or less freely 
across platforms. By analyzing some of the posts that emerged after the crash, and keeping in 
mind the official demands for media reports regarding the crash, the Wenzhou train crash 
facilitates a venture into some of the complex dynamics at play in the negotiation of 
information and expression between authoritarian rule and content control, and firsthand 
sentiments and views on greater social issues within the public.  
The train crash in Wenzhou represents first and foremost a terrible human tragedy where too 
many lives were lost, and is an incident that needs to be handled with respect and caution 
when implemented into a research project. Compared to a case like the Guo Meimei incident, 
                                                
22 Shanghaiist. 2011. ”Even CCTV's now turning up the heat on the Ministry of Railways” 
http://shanghaiist.com/2011/07/28/watch_cctv_news_anchor_qin_fang_una.php (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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the human tragedy of the train crash represents the major difference between the two, in other 
aspects the two cases share similarities; both generated millions of posts and comments on 
Sina Weibo; both gained nationwide attention; both gained widespread attention offline which 
would only be natural with such a tragic incident as the train crash, but not necessarily so with 
the case of the money-flaunting young woman. The human tragedy of the train crash led to 
comments, here observed only on Sina Weibo, and not so much in traditional media outlets, to 
take on a more humane form than the comments relating to the case of Guo Meimei, which 
were overwhelmingly negative in general. The criticism of Guo Meimei targeted not only the 
organization of The Red Cross Society in China and the overreaching implications of 
corruption it also targeted her personally. Posts regarding the train crash, on the other hand, 
took on a more nuanced form, presenting a more balanced focus in questions of how such a 
terrible accident could happen at all; how the government acted in response to the crash; 
expressions for public grief; concern in calls for blood-donations and so on. With the 
familiarity of Sina Weibo gained by following the Guo Meimei case, maneuvering the more 
complex case of the Wenzhou train crash became a threshold that could be overcome, and the 
train crash in Wenzhou was consequently chosen as a single, unique case fort his study. This 
project is therefore conducted within a design of an holistic single-case study, with the 2011 
train crash in Wenzhou as a critical case analyzed in light of the theoretical framework 
proposed by Dahlgren (2005a), and with material directly linked to crash as its main base for 
data-withdrawal and subsequent analysis.  
4.4.2 Constructing a protocol and identifying the data 
The process of coding qualitative material can take on different forms. This study draws upon 
Gibbs (2007), who separates between concept-driven and data-driven coding, where concept-
driven coding is aided by a pre-set list of thematic ideas that the researcher might have 
generated from previous studies, research literature, personal hunches etc. (Gibbs 2007: 44-
45). With the two approaches not being mutually exclusive (Ibid: 46), this project has moved 
back and forth between the two; by first applying an observational approach to gaining a basic 
understanding of Sina Weibo, and thereafter having based a design for a study on a clear 
theoretical framework, the first onset for coding was concept-driven, with a list of preset 
concepts and themes being applied to a pilot study that aimed to be a small-scale version of 
the final study. The list of preset concepts was however also before the pilot study had been 
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conducted believed to be in need of revision before the final study, and was therefore only to 
serve as a basis for identifying further themes and concepts in order to remain open for data-
driven revision in the final analysis. The basic, concept-driven list of themes and concepts for 
the final study consisted of: 
1) Sentiment of content: content of posts that described critique, support, grief, anger 
etc. 
2) Use of images: posts that in addition to text added content of pictures relating to the 
crash, like on-site pictures, passengers lists, family members/friends of passengers, 
government officials, grief and national sentiment, newspapers reports etc. 
3) Use of video: posts that in addition to text added content of video from on-site 
locations, passengers, news reports, grief and national sentiment etc. 
4) Use of internet meme/internet slang 
5) Embedded posts from other Sina Weibo users 
6) Numbers of times reposted / number of times embedded post has been reposted 
By identifying material that possibly could be built in to the final analysis, the hopes were 
also to test and develop the pre-existing ideas of what information might be found within in 
the Sina Weibo posts. Pilot studies are also a, if not integral, then highly advised, part of a 
case study design (Yin 2009: 94-95). 
4.4.3 Pilot study 
The main challenge for a qualitative content analysis based on exploring the Sina Weibo 
infrastructure, is identifying a selection of profiles to study, as there in theory are potentially 
300 million profiles eligible for analysis.  
An analysis of any online public sphere should strive to include as many layers of the online 
community in question as possible. On a basic level, the public sphere is believed to be in 
negotiation with the state, so representatives from state agencies should be included if 
possible. The mass media, serving as channels for negotiation between state and public, 
should also to be included. On the other side of the negotiations table we find the public, so 
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citizen-voices were to be included as well. As expression of public sentiment, civil society 
could form valuable pressure groups in negotiations between state and society, so non-
governmental organizations should were also to be included in the selection.  
For a pilot study for this project, I started exploring Sina Weibo for profiles that would fit 
within five preset categories profiles:  
1) Official and verified profile affiliated with Wenzhou or central government (see also 
section 5.1.2 for more on the Sina Weibo verification process) 
2) Non-governmental organizations  
3) Verified profile of opinion leaders  
4) Verified private profile 
 5) Verified profile of official media organizations  
One profile from each category was identified for the pilot study, with a maximum of ten and 
minimum of five Weibo posts withdrawn from each profile. In exploring and observing Sina 
Weibo, the selection of profiles for the pilot study was identified during August and September 
2011. For most part the identification of profiles were arbitrary, starting by an in-site search 
using keywords like ‘Wenzhou power car’ (8B) or 7.23 power car’ (7.23).  A 
profile belonging to the official news agency Xinhua, called Xinhua point of view (w3¶) 
was not added by arbitrary selection, but was included as an example of a professional media 
organization known to represent the CCP party line. Following an in-site search for profiles run 
by official entities a profile run by the Wenzhou police, named Wenzhou safety (平安温州) met 
the criteria for having posted at least five posts regarding the crash, and was added to the pilot 
as an example of a verified official profile. 
A similar in-site search for non-governmental organizations made it apparent that those are 
harder to come by on Sina Weibo. However, while typing in keywords like those stated 
above, the in-site search function of Sina Weibo provided a list of search phrases that 
included, but also extended my initial keyword, leading to profiles with official sounding 
names like Wenzhou High-speed Train Derailment Rescue Team (Y1¿¨ÀtnÏ). In 
exploring previous posts from the profile-history, it became clear that the profile belonged to 
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an individual who after the crash had changed the profile-name to a more organizational-
sounding name relating to the train crash. That an apparently private Netizen would alter their 
Sina Weibo profile to something resembling an official-sounding organization was found to 
be very interesting, a re-naming that also carried connotations of some kind of civil-sounding 
organizations. This profile was therefore included in the selection of profiles for the pilot 
study as a modification to the category of non-governmental organizations, altering the 
category into rather carrying examples of a sort of pseudo civil society found on Sina Weibo. 
By exploring Sina Weibo, the mysterious blogger Ran Xiang (~Õ), self-proclaimed 
president of the Wu Mao Dang, was identified and added to the pilot study within the 
category of opinion leaders, while a blog post23 started out as a source for identifying a 
private user that had expressed their sentiments regarding the crash on their microblog profile.  
In order to be included in the selection for further analysis, the posts had to be posted between 
July 23 and August 01, and needed to refer to ‘train crash in Wenzhou’, ‘Wenzhou incident’; 
refer to the date of the crash, ‘July 23’, ‘7.23’ or ‘723’; refer to the Ministry of Railway or 
people affiliated with the Ministry of Railways; or refer to the Internet meme that in initial 
research stages had been identified as relevant for the train crash, “Whether you believe it or 
not, I certainly believe [it to be true]”.24 The profiles had to include a minimum of five posts 
regarding the crash, and a maximum of ten posts regarding the crash were gathered from each 
profile. In order to highlight information diffusion, the selection of posts was based on 
frequency of reposts. Comments in form of threads linked to posts were not included in the 
analysis. Based solely on my own understanding, the posts were imported into the research 
software HyperResearch for additional coding. The software handles both text and image data, 
and therefore served the content-rich posts of Sina Weibo well.   
Initial findings of the pilot study showed that by immersing myself into Sina Weibo, the 
Wenzhou train crash indeed offered a well-documented case that was suitable for further 
exploration of Sina Weibo. The selection of posts was discovered to be flawed in terms of 
discovering traits of information diffusion; under each Weibo post there is a number showing 
how many times a post has been reposted. However, if the post contains an embedded repost 
from another Weibo user, the embedded post also contains a number showing how many 
                                                
23 http://hyperallergic.com/31517/social-media-street-art/ (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
24http://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/Whether_you_believe_it_or_not,_it%E2%80%99s_up_to_you,_but_I_do_an
yway. (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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times that – now embedded - post has been reposted. For the selection of posts in the pilot 
study I did not include numbers of reposts of embedded posts into my organization of most 
reposted posts, thereby possibly excluding posts that had been widely diffused, which also 
missed an opportunity to explore how information on Sina Weibo flowed outside the very few 
profiles I had identified myself. Therefore, for the further selection of posts for the final 
analysis the number of forwards of embedded posts were given priority. 
4.4.4 The Final Selection 
Two new categories of profiles were added to the selection of profile categories after the pilot 
study. The first, media professionals, was added as a weighing point of official news 
organizations, as journalists are known to be active Sina Weibo users, and their personal 
opinions might differ from the opinions portrayed by official news outlets. The second 
addition was a category situated close to the semi-official organizations; profiles dedicated to 
rumor busting. With the amount of chaff and unverified information floating around on Sina 
Weibo, some Weibo users have dedicated effort to refute rumors and verify information. 
However, not all of these rumor busting profiles might be legit themselves, further adding 
navigational issues in the Chinese online information stream. The rumor busting profiles have 
nevertheless found a function within the Sina Weibo structure, with Sina Weibo running a 
rumor busting profile on its own.25 
With a revised set of categories for profiles in place, a goal of identifying approximately two 
hundred posts for final analysis was set to be manageable in terms time and resources. The 
decision was made to identify three separate profiles within each profile-category, and to 
withdraw a maximum of ten posts from each profile for final analysis, which would bring the 
maximum number of posts for analysis up to 210. As a number of this maximum number of 
210 posts would contain embedded posts, and as these also would be analyzed, the final 
selection of posts for analysis could (and probably would) however exceed 210, but still be 
within a manageable amount in terms of time and resources.   
Adding upon the profiles identified for the pilot study, further profiles within the categories of 
private profiles, semi-organizational and rumor busting profiles were identified by arbitrary 
explorations, pretty much like it would for any Weibo users searching for profiles of interest 
                                                
25http://e.weibo.com/weibopiyao?ref=http%3A%2F%2Fs.weibo.com%2Fuser%2F%2525E8%2525BE%25259F
%2525E8%2525B0%2525A3%26Refer%3Dweibo_user (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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to follow. I did curiously enough not come across the profile dedicated to rumor busting that 
is run by Sina Weibo, but did by exploration of various other profiles identify a profile called 
the Rumor Busting League (Á¼¥), Wenzhou Train Crash Fact Search (Y1¿ÆX
mU), as well as AC Kongqi Xibo (AC !):); by description on his Weibo profile a 
‘amateur rumour-hunter’, and also affiliated with Anti-CNN, a web site dedicated to correct 
what the founders of the site deem to be biased reports on China by Western media.26 
Profiles belonging to the category of official verified profiles were identified by exploring 
government profiles listed within the ‘hall of famous people’ (:C), as provided in the 
Sina Weibo ‘public square’ (]B).  
Selecting three private profiles to study would by no means be hard with such a large user-
base available, but as it was this category that was most vulnerable in regards to privacy, a 
few criteria were set; private profiles for the final selection all had more than 10.000 fans 
(followers) and had posted over 500 posts.  
The categories of opinion-leaders, media professionals and professional media organizations 
were seen as examples of participants that are part of a public space that might be closer to the 
center of power (Dahlgren 2005b, 420), and the selection of profiles from these categories has 
aimed at portraying a diversity in viewpoint. In addition to the profile run by news agency 
Xinhua, a profile belonging to liberal newspaper Southern Weekend, and the conservative 
newspaper Global Times were identified as selection of profiles for the category of official 
media organizations. Blogger and self-proclaimed citizen journalist, Lao Rong ("I), as well 
as the former journalist and outspoken blogger Muzi Mei (	)27 were added to the 
selection for the category of opinion leaders. Finally, editor of conservative newspaper Global 
Times Hu Xijin (9), as well as news editor for one of the few privately owned and 
known to be outspoken television station Phoenix Television, Luqiu Luwei H*$G), and 
commentator and columnist Yang Jin Lin (;J) were added to the selection of profiles for 
the category of media professionals. There were many voices to be heard on Sina Weibo in 
the days after the crash. This study, with limited scope of selection of profiles, had no 
intention of capturing them all. The profiles selected for further analysis might not even be the 
                                                
26 http://www.m4.cn/ (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
27 Journalist and blogger Muzi Mei uses an alias as her username on Sina Weibo, 	 
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most representative ones within the myriad of profiles available on the application. To address 
such issues, the decision to withdraw the most forwarded posts from each profile would seem 
to help to at least identify posts that were of added value to more than solely the Weibo users 
who posted the post in the first place. Also, by adding emphasis to the number of reposts in 
embedded posts, posts that had been posted by other Weibo users (and then reposted by 
someone belonging to my selection of profiles) would be added to the selection of posts for 
analysis, thereby also adding a new layer of voices within the identified profile-categories. 
Still keeping selection of posts in lines of minimum five posts regarding the crash being 
identified on each profile, a selection of maximum ten of the most forwarded Weibo posts 
were withdrawn from each profile. During the time of profile identification process, all 
profiles met the criteria of containing at least five posts regarding the crash, but not all 
profiles were found to contain as many as ten posts concerning the train crash. If this was the 
case, another profile was added to the category to bring the number of posts withdrawn form 
each category of profiles as close as possible to the goal of 210, still not counting embedded 
posts.  
Furthermore, in order to explore opportunities and limitations of microblogging, five media 
directives that had been leaked online were also added to the data selection following the pilot 
study. By adding media directives as an analytical level for content analysis of the Sina 
Weibo posts regarding the Wenzhou train crash, it was the hopes that the final analysis would 
be able to identify not only some of the major themes of public concern and interest regarding 
the train crash, but also highlight some of the negotiations and boundaries of expression in 
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5 Analysis 
The following analysis is two-fold; first, the infrastructure of Sina Weibo is analyzed in its 
own right in an effort to contextualize Sina Weibo as a communication tool within the greater 
Chinese online space. Secondly, a content analysis of leaked media directives, as well as 281 
Sina Weibo posts regarding the Wenzhou train crash, are used to identify some of the main 
possibilities and limitations Sina Weibo proposes to its users within its infrastructure, and to 
pinpoint some of the main themes of public interest regarding this specific incident, as an 
example of online negotiation of public discourse in online China.  
 
Based on the simplified model of the Chinese online sphere in section 3.2.2, Sina Weibo is 
argued to be a semi-public28, content regulated, high-speed, two-way communication platform 
and personal publishing tool. As an application that in principle is open and accessible for 
everyone with Internet access by computer or smart-phone, Sina Weibo has grown popular 
amongst a variety of Netizens, adding celebrities, opinion leaders, news organizations, 
multinational corporations, as well as the general public to their user demographic. With 
personal expression blended with news, entertainment, games and more, presented within a 
common-for-all infrastructure that largely dismisses communicative boundaries between 
Netizens of varying social status, Sina Weibo functions as a sub-sphere for communication 
and interaction within the greater online space of China, that also offers an easy-to-use 
platform for self-expression which is much more accessible to the greater public than the 
traditional media-channels in China. 
5.1 The structures of Sina Weibo 
After registering an account with Sina Weibo, you get access to your own personal Sina 
Weibo page, your profile page. By navigation from this profile page, you are free to add 
whoever you want to your list of profiles that you ‘follow with interest’ (D), and see which 
users of Sina Weibo follow you, in the list of ‘fans’ (2). In regards to user relationship, 
Sina Weibo is not mutually reciprocal; you are free to follow whomever you want, but those 
you follow do not have to follow you back, and you choose whether or not you want to follow 
                                                
28  Registration is needed in order to use the application 
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someone who follows you. Popular celebrities might have millions of ‘fans’, but only follow a 
small amount of profiles themselves. You might want to follow your favorite newspapers for 
updates, but they do not necessarily follow you back. The structure helps build a more 
arbitrary network that extends well beyond off-line networks, and fosters a low-threshold 
opportunity to interact with people you not necessarily would have any contact with offline. 
You post Weibo posts from your personal profile page, and it also displays a continuously 
updated feed of posts posted by those profiles you follow. Your Sina Weibo profile page 
offers possibilities to add personalized information like occupation and interests, as well as 
options to add a profile picture and add graphical background pictures of your own choice. In 
addition to your own Weibo posts, and the feed of posts from those you follow, there is an in-
application chat function available for interaction with other online Sina Weibo users. Sina 
Weibo offers a variety of additional in-application features like gaming, group buying and a 
tool that can be used to ask Sina Weibo users to answer questions in polls. Such features, if 
successful, could help keep Netizens happily entertained within the application, making it a 
saturated web-experience catering to an array of needs; from keeping tabs of celebrity gossip, 
staying in touch with your friends, asking fellow Weibo-users their opinion, reading jokes or 
keeping up to date on news stories. Sina Weibo is an entertainment center, a news portal and a 
tool for personal publishing, all rolled into an easily navigated online infrastructure. 
5.1.1 Posting ‘Weibos’ 
Once you are a registered user, you can post microblogs yourself. The post will appear in a 
feed, or timeline, on your followers profile page, just as Weibo posts posted by users you 
follow will appear in a feed on your profile page. Like Twitter, each Weibo post has a 140-
character limit, however you can say far more with 140 Chinese characters than by using the 
Latin alphabet. You can also add emoticons and hyperlinks to your text, as well as pictures 
and videos, to create posts saturated with media. Also, so-called long-Weibos (7) 
enables you to posts text, or a combination of text and pictures, into a picture format, suitable 
for posts that will exceed the 140-character limit, in practice making the 140-character limit 
superfluous.  
Once a Weibo is posted, fellow Weibo users are free to comment and forward your post. Each 
post provides information on date and time for posting, as well as how many times a post has 
been forwarded (E), and how many comments ( %), it has received. Another way to 
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comment on posts is by adding your own text when forwarding the Weibo. Interaction on 
Sina Weibo, like Twitter, uses the @-sign before usernames to mark original sources, to 
indicate response or reply to users, or as a means to make specific users aware of posts or 
comments.  
 
The option to forward posts highlights information diffusion within the Sina Weibo 
infrastructure. Forwarding posts offers an effective process of information sharing across your 
network. Adding comments to Weibo posts does on the other hand facilitate direct interaction 
and participation across the Sina Weibo user base. However, it is also worth noting that you 
do not need to follow a Weibo user in order to forward or comment on posts, further adding to 
the open structure of Sina Weibo. Weibo posts that are featured on Hot-topics list have often 
been forwarded thousands of times, and received thousands of comments. In the data of the 
Wenzhou train crash, Weibo posts that had been forwarded hundreds of thousands of times 
were identified, offering a testimony for the potentially huge power of information diffusion 
within the Sina Weibo infrastructure.  
 
Information is however not diffused in an unhindered manner on Sina Weibo. Sina is bound 
to follow official media regulations, meaning that posts that are regarded as being in 
violataion with official policies can be deleted by Sina Weibo, and in-sight searches for 
certain topics might not yield any results. A search for ‘collective stroll (4-
)’29 using 
Sina Weibo renders no other result than a standarized message from Sina Weibo telling that 
“In accordance to relevant laws, regulations and policies, search results for “collective walk” 
can not be displayed”30 (see Picture 1), before offering suggestions to alter keywords and 
search again, or check out lists of the latest news.  
 
 
                                                
29 The term ‘collective stroll’ first appeared online in June 2007, when people took to the streets in the city of 
Xiamen to protest a PX-facotry under construction. It refers to a non-violent expression of citizens’ 
dissatisfaction, which is formed in an apolitical matter with its absence of banners or slogans that one usually 
finds in demonstrations.  
30 
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Picture 1 Screen-shot of ‘Collective stroll’ search from Sina Weibo 
 
Posts containing filtered words might however still be available by browsing individual user 
profiles, but will not show up in the in-application search, making them harder to identify. 
The lists of filtered words are not static, but in a state of flux, and might change on a day-to-
day basis. Keywords that once were blocked might suddenly produce results again, and 
keywords that have been accessible before might suddenly be blocked. In the summer of 2011 
Weibo searches including the Chinese character for ‘river’ () resulted in a message like the 
one stated above, sparking online rumor that former president Jiang Zemin (?') had 
died31, fueled also by the former president being absence at the monumental celebration of the 
CCP’ 90th anniversary during the same time period (BBC 2011). By filtering search terms, the 
government is able to control content, but at the same time they indirectly offer Netizens 
grounds for speculation by implicit giving an indication of what information the government 
deems too sensitive for public comment and debate.  
5.1.2 Verification and user registration 
Sina Weibo offers a verification system for user profiles, both for individual users and also for 
profiles belonging to organizations. At the end of 2011, verified Sina Weibo profiles reached 
300.000 (Chen and She 2012: 2), making it only a small percentage of Sina Weibos total user 
base. Basic requirements for individual users for having their profile verified, includes a true 
photo as profile picture, no alias as user-name and having more than 100 followers. Users also 
have to provide residential identification, job description and employment details, as well as a 
                                                
31 He had not: http://shanghaiist.com/2011/10/09/jiang-zemin-xinhai.php (last accessed 30.11.12) 
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brief user description. After verifying and approving the application, Sina Weibo adds an 
orange ‘V’ after your Sina Weibo username, as a completion of the verification process. For 
organizational profiles, Sina Weibo provides a blue ‘V’ as sign for verification that just like 
for verification of individual users, are meant to provide trustworthiness of information, and 
combat speculations and rumors within the Sina Weibo infrastructure. The case of Guo 
Meimei revealed flaws in the verification process, as her verified identity of “general manager 
for Red Cross Commerce" (China Daily 14.12.2011) was contested by another Sina Weibo 
user, and proved indeed to be false thereby unveiling one of the biggest events in online 
China during 2011. Further diminishing the system are reports that some companies, for a fee 
of 80USD, offer verification outside the Sina Weibo verification process (The Economist 
2012). In addition to orange and blue verifications, Weibo DaRen (d°Â)32 offers 
‘expert-verification’ in form of a red star next to your username for those who add lists of 
personal interest to the verification process, and eventually also issuing a ‘social credit card’ 
offering bonus points for use and discounts to the four million Sina Weibo users who now 
have DaRen verification (Ye 2012). Further adding to the myriads of Sina Weibo profile 
types, is the option to become a Sina Weibo VIP member (7=)33, where a monthly fee 
of 1.50USD gives you eighteen different privileges, including an ‘exclusive symbol’ in form 
of a crown next to your username, extended ability to follow users anonymously, and the 
possibility to un-follow users while still appearing to follow them (Carter 2012).  Paid 
membership on Sina Weibo is not that much different from signing up by free registration, but 
if you are looking to fly more under the radar on Weibo, the features of paid membership 
might seem appealing. Also, paid membership could also possibly help handle issues of spam 
accounts, as those who run multiple fake, spam accounts, might not be willing sign up with 
paid membership for all of them. The various profile options Sina offers, are seen as a 
measure to keep users engaged in the platform, and in the case of VIP membership, also as a 
mean to monetize Sina Weibo. The case of Guo Meiemei as well as the reports of 
verifications for sale, weakens the trust of Sina Weibo’ many verification processes, and 
offers few other solutions for Sina Weibo users than to always keep in mind that seemingly 
verified profiles might indeed be false. The issues of verification therefore had implications 
for this study as well; despite not being able to fully verify profiles with verification-marked 
profile names, verification was kept in the protocol for profile-selection as prefred for all 
                                                
32Weibo DaRen: http://new.club.weibo.com/ (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
33 Sina VIP membership: http://vip.weibo.com/privilege (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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profile categories. Within the final selection process it was however difficult to in the end 
identify all-verified profiles in each category, and five of the profiles in the final study are 
therefore unverified (no blue or orange V and no crown symbol), belonging within the 
profile-categories of semi-organizational profiles, private profiles and rumor busting profiles. 
For private profiles a high number of fans indicated that many did indeed trust the profiles, 
and the profiles of rumor busting and semi-organizations were regarded as valuable and 
somewhat unique types of profiles of Sina Weibo, securing a rational in the final selection 
even if they were unverified. The various verification symbols can be confusing, and the lack 
of trustworthiness misses the purpose of such processes completely. Verifications do however 
help to make the various types of profiles more distinct from each other, and as for all 
Netizens using Sina Weibo, critical navigation of profiles and the information they provide 
would always have to be found in a fundamental reading of content. Healthy skepticism 
towards information should be kept independent regardless of verification processes.  
5.2 Content Analysis of Media Directives 
The five directives that has been applied directly in relations to the analysis of Sina Weibo 
posts, all stem from the web site China Digital Times, and were found in two different 
postings on the site entitled Directives from the Ministry of Truth: Wenzhou High-speed Train 
Crash (CDT 2011a), and Directives from the Ministry of Truth: July 5-September 28, 2011 
(CDT 2011b). According to China Digital Times, the translated directives surface from “[…] 
a variety of sources” and are checked against “[…] official Chinese media reports to confirm 
their implementation” (CDT 2011a; CDT 2011b). In order to better understand the scope and 
overall tone of Chinese media directives, the content of the directives directly relating to the 
Wenzhou train accident are compared to other directives that were leaked in the same China 
Digital posts (as found in CDT 2011b).  
5.2.1 Directives in general 
Altogether, twenty-seven media directives are found in the two separate China Digital Times 
posts (CDT 2011a; CDT 2011b). In the post Directives from the Ministry of Truth: Wenzhou 
High-speed Train Crash (CDT 2011a) there is one directive regarding the train crash, while in 
the post Directives from the Ministry of Truth: July 5-September 28, 2011 (CDT 2011b), four 
directives directly concern the Wenzhou train crash. The remaining twenty-two directives of 
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this second post relate to a variety of different topics, such as drought, a chemical plant, a 
charity federation, land grabs, home-purchasing restrictions, a basketball match, the rumored 
death of former president Jiang Zemin, independent candidates running for election, the 
American ambassador buying a cheap lunch in Beijing, a bank run, an attack by ruffians on a 
Xinjiang police station, a woman believed to be promoted on basis of being a mistress, and 
incidents with political activists. The directives are all dedicated to one specific topic or case, 
often referred to as an ‘incident’ (ħ¤). Of the twenty-seven directives, twelve were issued 
by the Central Propaganda Department, with the rest being issued by the State Council 
Information Office, as well as a variety of local propaganda departments across China.  
Almost a third of the non-crash related directives order media outlets not to ‘hype up’ (9ƿ) 
incidents, sometimes with also offering a clear frame for reporting:  
From the Central Propaganda Department: All media outlets are to carefully handle reports on land 
grabs. Do not question the legitimate procedure of demolition; do not offer public support to those 
who ask for unreasonable compensation; do not report forced demolition related incidents 
involving suicide, self-harm, or large groups. Do not hype up the very few extreme cases. No 
collective or linked reports will be allowed. (CDT 2011b)34 
 
Another seven of the non-train crash related directives, tells the media to refrain altogether 
from reporting on incidents. For instance, on August 18 2011, coinciding with an official visit 
by US vice-president Joe Biden, a basketball game between a US team from Georgetown 
University and Chinese team Bayi Rockets ended in an on-court brawl between players (BBC 
2011b). Two days later a media directive surfaced:  
From the State Council Information Office: All media outlets are not to report the fight between 
the Bayi Rockets and the Georgetown Hoyas. Control needs to be strengthened over all online 
sports channels, military channels, and websites. All online discussion forums, microblogs, and 
interactive programs are not to hype up the incident. All related pictures and video clips are to be 
promptly removed (CDT 2011b)35 
 
Also, more dramatic and grave news are at times found to be off-limits for Chinese media 
outlets, like this directive issued on August1 15:  
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From the Propaganda Department of the Qingdao Municipal Party Committee: According to 
instructions from the superiors, all media outlets are prohibited from reporting the incident during 
this morning’s forced demolition at #9 Shantou Road, in which a former military officer used 
gasoline [to] set himself on fire (CDT 2011b)36. 
 
As seen in the examples stated above, the directives will at time also function pretty much 
like news-stories or sources of information in their own right; from reading leaked media 
directives, you not only get a sense of what information the government seeks to control, and 
what measures they in each incident apply to gain control, but you also get an update of 
what’s been going on in China lately.  
5.2.2 Directives on the Wenzhou train crash 
Of the five directives directly relating to the train crash in Wenzhou, one did not have a clear 
date of issue, the three others were dated July 24, July 25 and July 29 (CDT 2011a; CDT 
2011b). The directives were posted to the China Digital Times site in two separate posts, with 
one directive leaked July 25 (CDT 2011a), and the three others on October 20 (CDT 2011b).  
On July 24 a directive with an unspecified sender was issued as a “Reminder of reporting 
matters”:  
All reports regarding the Wenzhou high-speed train accident are to be titled “7.23 Yong-Wen 
line major transportation accident.” Reporting of the accident is to use “ ‘in the face of great 
tragedy, there’s great love’” as the major theme. Do not question. Do not elaborate. Do not 
associate. No re-posting on micro-blogs will be allowed! Related service information may be 
provided during news reporting. Music is to be carefully selected! (CDT 2011b)37 
 
The following day another directive was issued, this time from the State Council Information 
Office, with specific regulations for online media:  
From the State Council Information Office: All articles related to the Wenzhou hi-speed train 
crash are to be kept on back pages; no relevant articles are allowed on front pages. All news 
centres are to keep only one report of the most recent development. Do not release any 
commentaries. No recommendation of related topics on any forums, blogs, or microblogs will be 
allowed. Immediately remove all relevant posts and blogs that have already been recommended on 
front-pages. Any posts, blogs, or microblogs that are unable to meet the requirements based on 
today’s order must be deleted. All websites are to immediately carry out and implement this order  
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within the next half an hour. Review of implementation is required after another half an hour 
(CDT 2011b)38. 
 
Towards the end of the first week of the train crash aftermath, The Central Propaganda 
Department issued a directive telling the media to reduce reporting on the train crash 
drastically:  
From the Central Propaganda Department: Due to the increasing complexity of the domestic and 
foreign public opinion on the 7.23 Wenzhou high-speed train crash, all media outlets including 
all subordinate newspapers and news websites are to immediately cool off on reporting the 
accident. No additional reports will be allowed except positive ones or information released by 
authorities. Do not publish any commentaries (CDT 2011B)39 
 
All five directives mention restrictions regarding framing of reports, telling them not to 
reflect, associate or provide commentaries on matters relating to the crash. Two of the 
directives also ask that no questions should be asked, or investigations made. Of the five 
directives, three mention electronic media specifically, asking that no recommendations of 
blogs, forums, microblogs etc. be made, web sites are to be “well controlled”, and that content 
that does not meet requirements of the directives must be removed (CDT 2011a; CDT 2011b).  
The directives mainly seek to ensure that only official information is released, that no 
independent reporting should be done by journalist, that media should not make any 
individual assumptions concerning possible causes for the crash, or make suggestions in 
regards to who is to blame for the crash. Furthermore, an interesting aspect is that three of the 
directives give very distinct orders for how the media are to frame reports; the focus should be 
on acts of benevolence like blood donation and taxi drivers driving for free (CDT2011b). The 
overall theme of ‘in face of great tragedy there is great love’ is followed by a demand for 
emphasis on “touching stories”, and finally an order that “no additional reports will be made 
except positive ones (Ibid).  
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5.2.3 Directives compared 
With partial exception of a demand for ‘cool off reporting’, none of the train crash related 
directives tell media outlets to stop reporting on the crash. Overall the directives relating to 
the crash are more softer-sounding than the non-train crash related directives; instructing 
media not to release commentary or reflections on the train crash as opposed to not reporting 
on incident at all. The crash related directives are also more focused towards framing of 
reports than the non-crash directives, which instead are more focused towards not hyping up 
stories. Off course, the government would have had a hard time putting a full lid on such a 
tragic incident, with forty fatalities and nearly two-hundred injured by involvement of one of 
the most commonly used means of transportations. Further complicating matters for the 
authorities, where reports, speculations and debate quickly flooded online channels in the 
hours after the crash, making the media directive issued on July 24 seem like a somewhat 
slow official reaction. The non-crash related directives are not related to incidents with the 
same massive implications as the crash, although land grabs, forced demolitions and citizens 
running for office (CDT 2011b) are matters of great national concern as well. With framing of 
reports and Net behavior as the center of attention, the crash related directives are examples of 
the government’s efforts to guide public opinion; when the government cannot stop the media 
and the people from talking, they will at least do an effort to spin the reporting in a desired 
direction – in this case ‘in the face of great tragedy, there is great love’. 
5.3 Content analysis of Sina Weibo posts 
The following content analysis draws upon data gathered from profiles that were identified by 
exploring the infrastructure of Sina Weibo. The analysis starts by identifying sources of 
discussion on Sina Weibo regarding the Wenzhou train crash, and continues to describe three 
analytical layers applied for organizing the analysis. Within the three analytical layers, there is 
a close focus of four major themes indentified within the posts, that are presented 
individually, and also in form of a timeline from the first week following the crash to 
highlight interaction between the themes. Developing upon the initial outline of themes and 
concepts, the final analysis of Sina Weibo posts has been based on a data-driven approach for 
exploring themes and concepts within the final material. The basic concept-driven list of 
themes and concepts from the pilot study expanded to include 184 codes across three different 
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layers; 1) non-content specific characteristics, 2) major themes of discussion and 3) content 
within the major themes of discussion.  
5.3.1 Identifying Sources of Discussion 
A total of twenty-two Weibo profiles were identified across the seven preset profile-
categories identified in section 4.4.4. Within these twenty-two profiles, a total of 4112 Weibo 
posts were posted between July 23 and August 1. Of these 1990 were related to the Wenzhou 
train crash. After withdrawing a maximum of ten and no less than five of the most forwarded 
posts relating to the crash, the total number of posts for analysis in the final selection reached 
196.40  Of these 196 Weibo posts there were 107 posts that contained an embedded post from 
other Weibo users, and as these also were analyzed, the final selection of posts reached 303. 
All these posts were analyzed and coded, and during the analysis 22 of the identified 
embedded posts were found to be reoccurring across profiles, bringing the number of unique 
posts that have undergone analysis down to 281. 
5.3.2 Layer 1: Non-content specific characteristics  
In addition to the content of posts, the more technical information provided by Sina Weibo in 
relations to each posts offers some interesting in-sight; especially frequency of posts, number 
of reposts, number of embedded posts and number of posts that also include other media-
formats in addition to text. 
Post frequencey 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the majority of the 196 posts that were withdrawn from the 
twenty-two profiles (not including dates of embedded posts), were posted in the three first 
days after the crash, with nearly 60% of the 196 posts posted between July 24 and July 26. 
                                                
40  The categories of opinion leaders, private profiles, media professionals and official media organizations all 
contain 30 posts each, while the categories of official verified profiles, semi-organizational profiles and rumor 
busting profiles contain 25, 25 and 26 posts respectively, as profiles within these categories saw examples of 
profiles that did not have as many as ten posts related to the crash to be withdrawn.  
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Figure 1. Post Frequency by date 
Due to limitations of the dataset for this project compared to the overall amount of posts 
relating to the crash on Sina Weibo, it is very important to note that there are no grounds for 
speculating whether this is representative for general posting frequency in regards to the train 
crash, and the figure is provided only to illustrate the frequency of this very limited portion of 
the overall discourse regarding the crash. It is however plausible to believe that within a fast-
moving medium like Sina Weibo, incident would receive most attention in proximity to their 
actual occurrence, thereby holding a preference for immediacy. There might however also be 
any number of reasons for why the analyzed data for this project in general shows a decline in 
frequency of posts during the first week; other stories might have already taken over as the 
front-runner on Sina Weibo; the first initial shock, grief and anger settled amongst Netizens; 
or it might just be that of all the hundreds of thousands of profiles containing posts regarding 
the crash, the twenty-two represented here did by coincidence not contain many posts 
regarding the crash in the end of July 2011.  
Frequencies of forwards for individual and embedded posts 
As noted earlier, 107 of the 196 posts withdrawn from the twenty-two profiles contained an 
embedded Weibo post, indicating that across the frequency of posts, there are many Weibo 
users who use the application to spread posts by other Weibo users in addition to posting 
individual posts themselves. Almost half of the 196 posts withdrawn from the twenty-two 







Post frequency in % from July 23 to August 1 
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limited reach compared to the high density of Weibo users. Within the embedded posts, the 
information-sharing powers of Sina Weibo became more evident, with 18 of the embedded 
posts having been reposted more than 100.000 times. Some of the most reposted Weibo posts 
included a post honoring the memory of the driver who died while driving the D301-train, 
reposted over 260.000 times41, and a list of missing passengers was reposted over 520.000 
times42. A post offering economic support to a little girl who lost her parents in the crash, 
pledging to donate 1 RMB for every repost within twenty-four hours, truly demonstrated the 
diffusion powers of Sina Weibo with the post being reposted over 800.000 times43 (see also 
section 5.4).  
Frequencies of other media formats adding to text 
A total of 104 of 196 posts contained image in addition to text, 31% being on-site images 
portraying the damaged train sets, rescue effort, photos taken during press conferences and so 
forth. The material also included 14 posts that presented text in a picture format. Text as 
pictures can be used when the 140-character limit proves to restricted, but might also be 
applied as a measure to post more sensitive content, as the same filters for blocking keywords 
are harder to be implemented for pictures. Within the material, 10 posts also contained video 
clips; 4 of related to news reports; 1 covering a press conference; 1 on-site video; and 4 that 
had been removed or for whatever reason, thereby being unavailable at the time of this 
analysis. Despite being limited to only 140 text characters, the options to add photo and video 
to posts adds a layer of content to microblogs that ensures that the posts can be small in size, 
but big in meaning.  
5.3.3 Layer 2: Four major themes of discussion 
The second layer and third layer overlap, as they both frame the content of Sina Weibo 
discussion in regards to the crash. Layer two identified four main themes within the 281 
unique Weibo posts (196 originally identified posts + 107 embedded posts – 22 reoccurring 
posts = 281); and level three explored the content of these four major themes in a more in-
depth manner. The four main themes, as well as their main content specific characteristics 
were found to be:  
                                                
41 http://www.weibo.com/1926315504/xgvhlEdg7 (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
42 http://www.weibo.com/1199582333/xgrgSsgA8 (Last accessed 29.11.12)  
43 http://www.weibo.com/1496825941/xgzk8swmq (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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1) Posts that mainly provided information and news, like time and place of the crash; 
handling of passengers luggage; contact information for friends and family members 
of victims; passenger list; on-site rescue efforts; press conference reports; reference to 
media reports; official reports of death tolls and injured, and so forth 
2) Opinions regarding the crash; critique and support of the government or Railway 
Ministry; reflections on Chinas development, including high speed rail, and value of 
human life; reflections on media coverage; critique and support of the rescue effort 
and so forth 
3) Posts with mainly emotional characteristics; expressing condolences to victims, in 
general and/or to specific people involved; stories of an often dramatic character 
relating to victims of the crash, or people otherwise involved, and so forth.  
4) Posts containing speculations on a variety of issues like death tolls; cause of crash; 
rescue effort; levels of censorship and so forth 
 
 
Figure 2 The four dominant themes, in percent  
As seen in figure 2, info/news dominated as the major theme throughout the first week 
following the train crash, with over half of the analyzed Weibo posts belonging to this 
category. Opinions also had a dominant position within the first week of the train crash 
aftermath, sparking discussions on a variety of topics. When the four major themes are 
portrayed collectively according to their date of posting, as in figure 3, the nuances between 
the themes of info/news and opinion become clearer: while Weibo posts containing 
information and news overall remained dominant throughout the first week, and particularly 
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progresses, being equal to info/news on July 26 and dominant over info/news on both July 27 
and July 29.  
 
Figure 3 Frequency of all themes, by date 
Also, as posts found in the profile category of ‘official news media organizations’ have a 
news/information characteristic applied to them pretty much by default, controlling for codes 
of ‘info/news’ in that specific profile category indicates an even more prominent position of 
opinions in the overall data.  
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The four major themes overlap, with especially the themes of information/news, opinions and 
speculations being closely linked to each other. Posts referring to press conferences, or other 
news reports, would be coded as ‘News/information’, but also as ’opinion’ or ‘speculation’ if 
the Weibo-user in question added individual comments within the same post. The theme 
describing primarily emotional content separates itself more form the other overall themes, 
characterized by a lot of pathos-driven language, i.e. expressing condolences for the deceased.  
5.3.4 Layer 3: Content within the four major themes 
Despite overlap there are several individual characteristics of the four themes. For the third 
layer of analysis, the data was analyzed in order to discover the more specific characteristics 
within the four major themes, including but not limited to criticism and/or support of various 
kind; information concerning passengers; expressions of grief; sarcasm and use of Internet 
memes; calls for investigations and so forth. In order to organize the many types of expression 
properly, the four major themes will still serve as a main framing structure for the various 
types of content found in the second layer of analysis.  
Information and news 
Sina Weibo took form as a channel for information and news in the hours and first days after 
the train crash that Netizens seemed to appreciate greatly. The first reports of the crash came 
from inside the train when a passenger pleaded for help by her Sina Weibo profile. During the 
first hours after the crash, initial reports, including mostly bare specifics like time and place of 
the accident, started to surface on Sina Weibo, and the in-train online plea for help was 
reposted by other Weibo users over one hundred thousand times44.  After the crash, request 
for blood donors posted online lead to long queues outside Wenzhou hospitals45, and Sina 
Weibo also offered a channel for requests of human interest, where Netizens inquired about 
missing persons, often adding pictures and personal information like phone numbers to 
posts46. Posts containing passenger lists were also widely spread on Sina Weibo47, while 
                                                
44 Original post since removed from Sina Weibo:ĉ²Z:ũƜŋƜ·ËřƲóơ-ƖAũƜ:
ŬÍƸSÂĝƂúäƍƂquƿĐƕ?ÆÃW²Şè 
45 http://www.weibo.com/1189729754/xg8WjBX5q (Last accessed 29.11.12)
46 http://www.weibo.com/1199582333/xggk74pmn (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
47 http://www.weibo.com/1199582333/xgrgSsgA8 (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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Netizens also expressed anger towards the Railway Ministry for not making passenger lists 
publicly available48. Other widely circulated posts included reports of late-night digging with 
excavators on-site49 and a video-clip with statements from a Japanese Shinkansen expert 
stating that the Chinese high-speed trains has defects in its emergency technology, and that 
digging pits to bury the wreckages was ”ridiculous”50. On July 28, premier Wen Jiabao held a 
press conference at the site of the accident. The following day a dialogue between relatives of 
the deceased and the Premier emerged on Sina Weibo where the relatives expressed 
grievances regarding the circumstances of the rescue effort, like the focus of compensation for 
the deceased resembling ‘bargaining for cabbage’ and also demanding a full passenger list to 
be released51. 
Opinions 
The theme of opinions in the Sina Weibo posts, were divided between different types of 
criticism and support. Leaning more heavily towards criticism, the Netizens did not shy away 
form expressing their opinions on the Railway Ministry, local and central government, media 
coverage, as well as overall implications the crash might have for the Chinese society. 
Blogger Ran Xiang, known for a pro-government and nationalistic sentiment, cautioned 
people to use the train crash as an excuse to raise political issues52, and also questioned why a 
bus accident, killing forty-one passengers on July 22, did not receive the same widespread 
attention as the train crash53. Ran Xiang was not the only one voicing opinions that had an 
undertone of support. While the Chinese government in general was subjected to criticism, 
Weibo users were found to offer support for premier Wen Jiabao54; the Premier’ choice of 
footwear struck a note amongst the Netizens; a picture of Wen Jiabao wearing worn out 
sneakers was reposted over thirty thousand times on Sina Weibo and was followed by text 
holding a sympathetic tone towards the Premier55. Netizens also criticized officials from the 
Railway Ministry being interviewed inside an air-conditioned bus, while the Premier held his 
press conference in the heat under a bridge close to the scene of the accident, just days after 
                                                
48 http://www.weibo.com/1496825941/xgzq13QtI (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
49 http://www.weibo.com/1494720324/xgrlmywTV (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
50 http://www.weibo.com/1750935105/xgrfXaTTp (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
51 http://www.weibo.com/1189729754/xh0oZjXud (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
52 http://www.weibo.com/1654592030/xgrvLjyYY (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
53  http://www.weibo.com/1654592030/xgY0quO5b (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
54 http://www.weibo.com/1189729754/xgYMw3MmO (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
55 http://www.weibo.com/1750935105/xgTyfDrDA (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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he had been reported to being ill56. Other Weibo users expressed support for Wenzhou locals 
cuing at hospitals to offer help after “urgent appeals for people to come forward and give 
blood in all types of media, such as Weibo and radio broadcasts”57. Supportive statements 
were also issued for local authorities, including “rare but good party-secretary” Chen 
Derong58, and the local rescue effort. The future of Chinese railway was also a topic of 
discussion; Global Times editor Hu Xijin paraphrased Japanese news commentary on the 
future of export of Chinese high-speed train technology being severely threatened because of 
the crash59. Adding commentary to his own post, Hu Xijin expressed hopes for export to 
increase employment rate, and a hope that the Railway Ministry would face their problems 
and win back public trust60. Others were not so optimistic for the future, comparing travelling 
by Chinese high-speed rail with  “riding on a flying coffin”, and demanding explanations 
from the Railway Ministry61. The Wenzhou High-Speed Derailment Rescue Team reposted a 
message with a poetic reflection underpinned by despair:  
It is sad that one leader resigned as a scapegoat, it is suspicious how a stupid decision was 
made to cover up the accident, it is respectable of the local Wenzhou people with selfless kind 
hearts, it is lovable of the young boys fighting hard to save lives, it is a pity to see those victims 
who didn’t manage to break the car windows to escape, it is stupid to see the railway 
authorities only bragging on the good they did, it is laughable that the red cross only have a 
donation of 300,000RMB, reliable are the armed soldiers who dashed ahead heedless of safety, 
it is fearful to think that the high speed trains are going to run again right away on those tracks, 
it is hopeful for the Chinese high speed trains to slow down- @Yydan Jingdian Yulu62 
 
Media reports were also found to be quite critical and opinionated in their coverage; a Weibo 
post followed by news headlines from the liberal newspaper Southern Metropolis Daily was 
widely circulated, with an added comment from a Netizen on the integrity of news-reporting 
in the south, with headlines including “Truth is the best memory” and “A controversial rescue 
action”63. The newspaper the Weibo post refers to was released after at least two of the media 
directives regarding the crash were issued (with two being released prior, and one having 
                                                
56 http://www.weibo.com/1968545540/xgWLlv0sa (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
57 http://weibo.com/1663933725/xgebDBEw7 (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
58 http://www.weibo.com/1750935105/xgvxapF4Z (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
59 http://www.weibo.com/1989660417/xgFIF8dT1 (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
60 http://www.weibo.com/1989660417/xgFIF8dT1 (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
61 http://www.weibo.com/1494720324/xh9dAphHd (Last accessed 29.11.12) 




63 http://www.weibo.com/1199582333/xgXGT0FIc (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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unclear date of origin), and goes quite clearly against the major theme of the ‘great 
tragedy…great love’ by running headlines like “Dreams to be a diplomat stays forever on the 
Chinese railroad”64.  
Speculations 
The three main issues that saw widespread speculation amongst Netizens where mainly cause 
of the train crash, death tolls, and handling of the damaged train sets on-site. Speculations on 
death tolls were questioned throughout the first week after the crash; on July 31, the semi-
organizational profile of Wenzhou Train Incident Right Upholding Association asked a 
“simple math problem”:  
How do you work out this simple math problem? A total of 6 coach-train carrying 600 
passengers falls off the bridge, 210 people are found alive, but in the report by Xinhua news 
agency only 35 were dead, According to their data, then 600 (total) – 210 (injured) – 35 (dead) = 
355, so where did these 355 people go?65 
On July 26, a Weibo posts including an on-site picture of a severely damaged train set was 
forwarded over 118.000 times: The post offers room for interpretation in regards to 
censorship and withholding of information by calling the on-site picture “very precious” in 
the Weibo text, and also rhetorically asking, “how many bodies could come out of this?”66. 
Speculations on death tolls were also found linked together to another dramatic speculation 
regarding the crash, where the authorities were accused of trying to cover up responsibility by 
burying train sets shortly after the crash67. Over 61.000 Netizens reposted a Weibo stating that 
local villagers were outraged by train sets being buried, asking “what if there is still people in 
there?”68. The Weibo was also followed by a video clip, which since has been removed69-
There is however no telling who removed the clip; the author of the post, or Sina Weibo 
moderators.  
Sina Weibo users also speculated in why high-level officials did not visit the scene of the 
crash before July 28, when Premier Wen Jiabao finally made an appearance in Wenzhou. The 
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official reason for not visiting the scene of the crash earlier was reported to be due to the 
Premier being on sick-leave, which later was contested by reports that the Premier had 
attended a meeting in Beijing prior to his arrival in Wenzhou (Lasseter 2011). Blogger Muzi 
Mei commented that levels of censorship and control regarding the crash seemed very low, 
and whether or not the low degree of censorship was rooted in a government wish to “reform” 
the Railway Ministry70. Such speculations offer indications that Netizens suspect there might 
have been disagreement towards how to handle the circumstances around the train crash 
aftermath amongst higher-ranking officials. 
Emotions 
Weibo posts displaying emotions were found to be aimed at the tragedy of individuals 
involved in the crash, condolences in general to the deceased, as well as pathos-driven 
gratitude towards those involved in the rescue process.  
As an expression of condolences, the profile of Government Weibo Assistant encouraged 
Netizens to post emoticons of a lit candle to their profiles to commemorate victims71. A 
profile affiliated to the Wenzhou Railway offered an example of local initiative and rescue 
effort hand in hand by posting a picture of an old lady with “silver hair, holding a brand new 
kettle, serving her homemade tea the whole time to the fire-fighters and rescuers”72. Other 
posts gave credit for rescue workers working non-stop without warm food in rain, mud and 
heat73.  
There were also a number of emotional and very personal narratives to be found within the 
data material. Discussion of blame for the crash was by some Netizens argued to involve the 
drivers of the trains being exhausted and partly responsible for the tragedy. A post in defense 
of Pan Yiheng, the deceased driver of D301, was reposted over 230,000 times in the days 
after the crash:  
The train driver who died in the accident last night Pan Yiheng, was a good friend to my father. 
They used to work in the same team. My father was in deep sorrow after he heard the news, and 
said: Mr. Pan has a son who is only 7 years old. He is a good person, hardworking and 
responsible. If he had escaped before the collision, he could have saved his own life, but the 
death toll could have had increased over 10 times. It is sad to hear rumors, before his soul has 
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come to peace, saying that he worked under exhaustion and should be responsible for the 
accident. This is absolutely nonsense and unacceptable!74 
Other Netizens also offered their respect to Pan Yi Heng, who according to one Weibo post 
died 
[…] with the emergency break piercing through his chest in the rear-ended train accident at 
20:27 on the 23rd July 2011. Instead of fleeing for his own life, he managed to pull the 
emergency break in the last moment of the tragedy. He died at his post to save the lives of the 
passengers”75 
Another highly emotional narrative of passengers involved in the accident was the 
story of a deceased three-year-old boy, who reportedly was discovered at the same 
time rescue workers found the last reported survivor, a two-year-old, nick named Little 
Yiyi. The boy was said to have suffocated to death, adding heartbreaking details like 
traces of tears being visible on the little boys face as he lay in the body bag. A video 
with an interview with the teary-eyed father of the little boy, who also lost his wife, 
followed the post76.  
For a tragic accident like the Wenzhou, killing forty and injuring nearly two hundred, grief 
and sadness are natural emotions to have surfaced amongst Sina Weibo users, and a mixture 
of anger, sorrow and general despair runs as fragile thread through the analyzed material.  
5.4 The First Week: A 7.23.Weibo time line 
The previous categorization of the four major themes that were proposed by Netizens has 
identified the main points of public interest, but a timeline of the Weibo posts will offer 
additional insight into how the themes interacted with each other.  
As an online space that never seems to rest, the four major themes identified in the material 
surfaced more or less simultaneously on Sina Weibo in the hours after the crash. Widely 
circulated posts included reports of long queues by Wenzhou locals wanting to donate blood 
during the night of July 2477; and as a new day dawned speculations of death tolls and 
mistrust towards the Railway Ministry rose78. Netizens also quickly started to spread 
information seeking to locate relatives of victims, like a nine-year-old who had been separated 
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from her mother in the rescue effort79. July 24 also saw the beginning of one of the major 
narratives that would emerge from the train wreck, the story of Little Yiyi. The two-year old 
girl lost both her parents in the crash80, and was found alive in one of the train sets after the 
rescue effort had been shut down. In the morning of July 24, fire brigade teams, reported to 
have been searching through the fallen carriages “more than ten times”, reported there to be 
no more survivors, and official news reports on CCTV also stated there had been “no sign of 
life at the site of the accident”81. According to Sina Weibo posts, it was police captain Zhao 
Ye Rong, who by refusing to follow orders to stop the rescue operation82, was able to pull the 
two-year old girl Xiang Wei Yi out of a train set, twenty-one hours after the crash.  
After the ‘miracle’ of Little Yiyi, Weibo users harshly criticized the Railway Ministry for 
their handling of the rescue operation. At the same time critique on a more general level 
against the Chinese government, albeit still predominantly represented by the Railway 
Ministry, started to surface, with posts telling the Railway Ministry’ to “f*** off”83. Outrage 
was also expressed of allegedly large-scale corruption within the Railway Ministry, 
exemplified by the 2.8 billion US dollars discovered in overseas accounts belonging to Zhang 
Shuguang84, the engineer and former Railway Minister once known as the ‘grand designer of 
China’s high-speed rail’. 
Other wide-reaching microblogs included a picture comparing front pages of four Chinese 
newspapers to four Japanese front pages the morning after the crash85; the Chinese papers 
look more or less identical carrying reports on an official meeting in prominent view, next to 
the Japanese newspapers who all displayed big headlines on the train crash86. The post serves 
as a commentary towards the operating conditions for the traditional media, as well as a 
comment on streamlined media coverage dictated by control and regulations.  
Speculations on a series of aspects of the crash also started to grow amongst Netizens, 
especially regarding rumors that on-site excavators where burying the wrecked trains 
carriages, in what conceived by Netizens to be a very suspect handling of potential 
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evidence87. The digging pits were ‘clarified’ by the Rumor Busting League to allegedly be 
part of work to flatten the earth in order to convenience cranes that later would lift the train 
wrecks88. However, speculations of the excavators continued to float on Sina Weibo, with 
posts stating that local authorities disagreed with the burying89, as well as Netizens reporting 
that huge machines on-site were “smashing vehicles” in the evening of July 2590. Other 
speculations focused on death tolls; by means of online investigation, the Rumor Busting 
League busted online claims that in recent years the death tolls of major Chinese accidents 
had not exceeded 35, allegedly because exceeding this number would mean that the “relevant 
official in charge would be fired”91. The Rumor Busting League also posted information 
showing that a public march in Hong Kong, supposedly in support of the train crash victims, 
were in fact manipulated photos from a march in regards to a Philippine hostage case92. More 
media criticism also emerged, like a widely spread post commenting on a CCTV segment that 
devoted majority of its twenty minute duration to praising rescue effort and reporting how top 
leaders cared deeply about the matter, but only one minute to explain the crash, and zero 
minutes “[…]about burying the train and the responsibility”93.  
Amongst the most reposted microblogs during July 25 was an encouragement for posting a 
picture of a black ribbon as an offer of condolence to those involved in the crash, reposted 
over 400.000 times94. A list of names, put together by bloggers, providing information about 
lost relatives, was also spread widely, with over five hundred thousand Weibo users reposting 
it95. Pictures of an impromptu press conference, held by Yang Feng, a man who lost five 
relatives in the crash, also started surfacing, with Yang Feng telling how police reportedly 
stopped him and other relatives of victims from approaching a Railway Ministry official with 
demands for an explanation.  At the same time, the story of little Yiyi kept evolving; Ntizens 
spread a picture of the little girl on her first train ride96, taken only weeks before the 
devastating train crash. Railway Ministry spokesman, Wang Yong Ping, who on questions of 
how the little girl could be rescued after the announcement that there were no more sign of 
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life replied, “that’s a miracle”97, was also extensively criticized. During the same press 
conference Wang Yong Ping also provided Netizen with a quote that would become the very 
Internet meme relating to the train crash, when ending his effort to explain the circumstances 
for burying train sets with “whether you believe it or not, I certainly do [believe this 
explanation]” («#$$,k8$). Netizens heavily criticized the press conference, 
and in a later development Wang Yong Ping was removed from his position as Railway 
Ministry spokesperson, and re-located to a more obscure post in Poland (Jacobs 2011).  
July 26 saw a continuing speculation on death tolls, and Railway Minister Sheng Guangzu 
was subjected to criticism. One Netizen gave the official a “serious warning” in a widely 
circulated Weibo post asking the Ministry to stop insulting the intelligence of the Chinese 
people, and to issue a full passenger list98. A post forwarded more than 100.000 times, 
containing a picture that was “extremely hard to get hold on” showed parts of one of the 
wrecked train car, and asked Netizens to “make your judgment again” regarding the official 
death toll, which at that time had reached 3999. Kudos were also given to Weibo users, 
crediting online activity for a decision by officials, who by then had decided to “dig out the 
on-site buried train engine” for further investigation100. Regardless that the statement of such 
an investigation, credited to “the voices of doubt on Weibo”, came from an “unreliable 
source”101, Netizens seemed to accept the thanks with gratitude, forwarding the post a little 
over 100.000 times. The forwarding power of Weibo users was also further demonstrated on 
July 26, when businessman and Chinese congress member, Chen Li Hao, posted a microblog 
stating that for every repost of that particular Weibo within the next twenty-four hours, he 
would donate 1 RMB to Little Yiyi102. The microblog was reposted well over 800.000 times, 
and to commemorate her time of rescue, the total donation was documented the following day 
by a Weibo post containing a picture of a transfer receipt of 1,072 417,20 RMB (close to 
168,000 USD)103. In another developing story, Yang Feng, the man who lost five relatives in 
the crash was reported on Sina Weibo to have “changed his attitude greatly” after a meeting 
with the Workers Union in the Railway Ministry, dealing with issues of compensation for 
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relatives of the deceased104. Blogger Muzi Mei offered a short and pointed comment on the 
latest development of Yang Feng: “Oh, the government finally sealed his mouth”105. On July 
27, nearly ninety thousand Sina Weibo users forwarded a Weibo post comparing the lack of 
information of information regarding the crash, with the abundance of information available 
regarding a mass-shooting in Norway occurring the day before the train crash: 
We can get into some small details about a shooting incident in Norway over 10000 km away, 
but we cannot get any clear death toll on the accident in Wenzhou. We can interview the mayor 
in Norway or civilians, but we cannot get into a village next to the site. We can read pages of 
report about millions of people holding flowers and lighting up candles for their victims, but 
we cannot report about the candles we lighted last night at Wenzhou square. What a strange 
reality?106 
Reports also came that Wenzhou Judicial Administration Bureau and the Wenzhou Lawyer 
Association had notified all law firms not to accept any cases relating to the train crash, due to 
“sensitivity of the 7.23 accident to social stability”107.  
The on-site press conference held by Wen Jiabao on July 28 was met with support for the 
Premier by Sina Weibo users, in a somewhat rare expression of support within the posts 
concerning the crash. One Weibo post remembered how it was the Premier who also visited 
the earthquake-stricken areas in the province of Sichuan, where over 69.000 people lost their 
lives, and also pleading the Premier to punish those responsible for the train crash108. In 
contrast to the support of Premier Wen, parts of a Q & A with the National Railway Research 
& Design Institute of Communication and Signal Co. Ltd, left Netizen to express more 
critically inclined sentiments:  
The following is some of the Q & As. 
Q: Which models of the signal systems have you provided for the high-speed rail? 
A: This you can find out online. 
Q: How are you related to the Railway Ministry? 
A: You should know this if you are here.  
Q: Why are you holding this press conference then? 
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A: We don't know either. The weather is a bit hot. It wouldn't be convenient for you guys to be 
outside.  
Suddenly, the spokesman's mobile rang, he asked the reporters: Can I take it?  
A: You should at least show some respects to us. You are holding a press conference! 
Q: Well then I'll just take it.109 
 
Meanwhile, the newspaper Southern Weekend posted a series of Weibo posts stating that a 
reliable source at the Railway department had identified the cause of the crash to be faulty 
design of a control circuit from the China Railway Signal/Communication Corporation110. A 
tragic story of a deceased passenger, the three-year-old boy found in the same carriage as 
Little Yiyi, also surfaced on July 28. The next morning official news agency Xinhua posted a 
Weibo paraphrasing a widely circulated Weibo post that Little Yiyi’ mother had written to her 
daughter before her death, giving the post a higher meaning as a symbol of “the endless 
questions after the innocent lives lost”111. On July 29 news outlet Southern Weekend posted a 
Weibo referring to regulations of the Chinese constitution stating that any serious accident 
should be investigated thoroughly be a committee selected by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, and also demanded free public seats be available during the 
hearings, as well as live broadcasts in television and radio112. The same day over 119.000 Sina 
Weibo users forwarded headlines from the Southern Metropolis Daily, as another example of 
the “professional integrity of the people in Nandu”113. The headlines amongst other 
questioned why the Railway Ministry was in such a rush to get traffic back up and running 
after the crash. Meanwhile, rumor buster AC Kongqi Xibo, affiliated with a website dedicated 
to identify Western media reports with an anti-China bias, reposted a busted rumor of a “new 
miracle”114: A man perceived to be dead had been reported on microblogs to have abruptly 
gained consciousness after spending twenty-one hours in minus 21° in a funeral parlor. The 
story was claimed to be true, but happening in South Africa, and not China. Five Netizens 
were identified as having spread rumors that the story was related to the Wenzhou train crash 
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aftermath, and were punished by having their posting functions on Sina Weibo closed for a 
month115.  
On July 29 news outlet Southern Weekend also posted a Weibo criticizing the cost of 
‘efficiency’ in Chinese society, quoting an insider at the Railway Ministry stating that after 
the crash officials were mainly concerned with the reason for having traffic as soon as 
possible after the crash was to have traffic recovered as soon as possible and minimize effects 
of the tragedy116.  
Towards the end of the first week speculations on official death tolls continued117. One 
Weibo-user posted a portrayal of the Railway Ministry as the Grim Reaper in a picture that 
was followed by the text “They don’t allow us to speak then we draw (server 1)”118. 
 
Picture 2 Picture posted to Sina Weibo on July 29 (has since been removed) 
The mention of a specific server number indicates that numerous servers might be in use as a 
means to circumvent censorship. The gloomy interpretation of the Railway Ministry has since 
has been removed, either by the Netizen who first posted it, or by Sina Weibo moderators.  
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5.5 Limits and opportunities of Microblogs 
The main limitation of Sina Weibo for voicing opinion seems rather obvious; your Weibo 
posts might be removed. Together with blocking of keywords, removal of content is the most 
visible and clearly overt feature of limitations set forth by the microblogging application.  
Posts like the portrayal of the Railway Ministry as the Grim Reaper, which openly refers to 
censorship, is but one example of the visibility of content control on Sina Weibo. Yet another 
form of such a visible limitation are traces of content that has been removed: A post from a 
profile belonging to rumor busters Wenzhou Train Crash Fact Search comments “We see the 
advantages of China’s socialist system from the train collision in Wenzhou. PS: It is a miracle 
that a person who can write such an article is alive”119. However, the picture the post refers to 
has since been removed, and is instead replaced by a grey, standardized image used by Sina 
Weibo in place of the original posted image. The information given is thus not the image 
intended to be shared, but rather a layer of structural understanding that information has 
indeed been removed, forming a visible reminder of content control. Not all content could 
however be claimed to be removed by Sina Weibo, the picture in this example might have 
been removed by whoever posted it in the first place. But either way, the grey image offers a 
reminder that original content is missing. Removed videos follow the same principle as 
images120, and as with pictures it is important to keep in mind that also videos might have 
been made unavailable by others than Sina Weibo moderators. 
While removal of pictures and videos are accompanied by standardized replacements, Sina 
Weibo applies three different kinds of messages providing information that text has been 
removed. Two of the messages are very similar in wording; “Sorry, this microblogging has 
been deleted. For help, please contact customer service121” and “Sorry, this microblogging has 
been deleted by the original author. For help, please contact customer service”122. The third 
message reads, “Sorry, this microblogging is not suitable for open to the public. For help, 
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please contact customer service123”, thereby overtly stating that information has been removed 
to protect the public from some kind of ‘unsuitable’ information.  
Netizens also speculate in a type of ‘covered’ text censorship, where posts are visible to you 
on your own Weibo profile, but not visible for other Netizens who access your profile 
(Millward 2011), thus you have no clue that your posts in fact are being censored. Compared 
to the openness of censorship messages given in image, video and text, this would be a form 
of stealth-mode censorship.  
Despite these very visible limitations of microblogs on Sina Weibo, information and 
expressions found within the posts concerning the Wenzhou train crash as a space of 
opportunity as well; the space for expression offered by a microblogging tool like Sina Weibo 
can, when it is allowed to be, serve as a flexible space for wide ranging opinions, seemingly 
to a much larger extent than the official media channels. Bringing forth the media directives 
that were issued in regards to the crash, the inherent power of microblogging applications like 
Sina Weibo becomes even more apparent.  
5.5.1 Directives and online negotiation 
The main theme within the five directives that relate to the crash was a demand for “no 
commentary” and “no reflexive reports” (CDT 2011a; CDT 2011b). In this regard the posts 
from Sina Weibo quite clearly cross the limits of the media directives, with almost thirty 
percent of the 281 Weibo posts offering criticism and/or support. Many of the posts serve as 
powerful comments on not just the state of Chinese railway, but also on Chinese society in 
general: 
A strong country will not be overthrown by legalizing sale of weapons, but under a weak government, 
a real name may have to be given to buy a food knife. In a humane country, the president will 
announce the names of the victims one by one and give condolences, but under a dehumanized 
government, even the number of casualties needs to be hidden. In a free country, journalists can chase 
after, and question, the officials till they sweat with fear, but under a confined government, officials 
can say to the journalists: "whether you believe it or not, I believe it.124 
Although there were examples of posts from Sina Weibo that were in accordance with the 
major themes of ‘touching stories’ and the theme of ‘great tragedy…great love’, the critical 
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disposition of many of the most circulated posts, offers clear opposition to the frames given to 
mass media organizations by the directives. The demand of “no reporting on frequent basis” 
(CDT 2011a) found in the directives was massively ignored by Sina Weibo user, with 
millions of Sina Weibo posts. By the time the government had decided it was time to cool 
down reports on the crash and its aftermath, Netizens had already build a substantial 
information base. Within this information base there is however a lot of unverified 
information. The Chinese government has issued a combat against online rumors (Xinhua 
2012), but given the extreme complexity of information flow in all layers of the Chinese 
media spaces, one might wonder if the ‘rumors’ the government refers to would be regarded 
as ‘facts’ that have been censored by others. On the other hand, there is no denying that 
rumors and wild speculations are part of the Chinese Netizen culture, with the ‘new miracle’ 
of the man waking up in a funeral parlor, as one relevant example. 
The issues of rumors in online China are also fueled by the speed of the microblogging 
platforms, where increasingly popular use of these helps diffuse information to large 
quantities of recipients in a matter of seconds. Once a spark has been lit, it might be hard to 
control it from growing into a powerful flame, be it truthful or not. Presence of rumors and 
the speed of which they travel therefore also proposes a limitation of microblogs, as a 
limitation for trustworthiness for microblogs as part of public discussion. The speed of which 
information can be diffused, however, remains one of its most powerful features in 
negotiation against censorship and control. People will urge fellow Netizens to watch, spread 
or save information as quickly as possible before information might get censored, as one 
Netizen states; “This clip just got censored again, but I found it again, hope everyone takes a 
good look at before it gets censored, again.”125.  In what is perhaps a more surprising 
statement, the Government Weibo Assistant quoted the newspaper China Youth Daily in 
saying “The most important is that Weibo has changed the way information is spread. It has 
become more and more difficult to ‘refine/alter’ an incident/accident before it is announced to 
the public”126, again highlighting the diffusion powers of microblogging applications. For a 
profile fronting official representation such a statement is as puzzling as it is interesting, 
especially as official entities simultaneously actively frame public perception directly by 
implementation of media directives.   
                                                
125 http://weibo.com/1408482140/xgsaejLBT (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
126 http://e.weibo.com/2053061043/xgmMImgDT (Last accessed 29.11.12) 
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5.5.2 Negotiations by media ‘hybridity’  
Besides speed, the mixture of media formats that Sina Weibo supports in its infrastructure is 
of great value for expressing opinions; by adding text, image and video into microblogs, a 
new type of format is formed, with what can be called a ‘hybridity’ of formats that facilitates 
diversification of information; supplementing text with pictures and videos, posts on Sina 
Weibo holds a potential of offering a small but powerful and media-saturated format for 
personal publishing. Together with speed, this hybridity of formats is one of the most defining 
features of Sina Weibo, and also a feature of great importance in diffusing information of 
personal opinions. As a user-generated format, the hybridity of Sina Weibo helps negotiate 
opinions, often seen in combination with official media reports like newspaper articles or 
video-clips from news broadcasts. However, the traditional media pushes against government 
control of the media as well; the eight-page special on the Wenzhou train crash in The 
Economic Observer hit newsstands after the directive ordering stories to back pages the 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
With the stories of Sina Weibo and the Wenzhou train crash in mind, we return to the initial 
problem at hand; a contextualization of Chinese microblogging in greater online China, and 
reflections of how such applications relate to the concept of the public sphere. The work of 
Habermas, as well as his critics and supporters, offers a “useful analytic perspective” of media 
form a standpoint of democratic ideals (Dahlgren 2005b: 411). However, also in an 
authoritarian environment there seems to be flexibility for something resembling a form of 
public space for communication and opinion formation. 
6.1 Microblogging and Greater Online China 
Reflections regarding the two first research questions of how Chinese microblogging 
applications position themselves within the greater online space of China, and how 
microblogging tools relate to the concept of the public sphere, are interrelated. First and 
foremost, Chinese microblogging tools are inevitably part the same space as every other 
Chinese Internet application, contained within the frames of the Golden Shield and other 
forms of government control. Within the simplified model proposed during the course of this 
study in section 3.2.2), microblogging tools are somewhat unique in their current massive rise 
in popularity, increasing reported use by nearly 300% from 2010 to 2011 (CNNIC 2011: 42). 
Microblogging applications have thereby developed an important presence in Online China, 
and have been noticed internationally too; the word ‘Weibo’ has begun to show up in news 
reports and articles all over the world, and microblogs in China are often portrayed as a 
crowbar against oppression, and as a powerful tool for self-expression (DeWoskin 2012). The 
specific focus on microblogging separates itself from a more overall coverage on the ‘Chinese 
Internet’ in its entirety, thus separating microblogging more as a specific element of Chinese 
Internet culture. As online China still largely remains contained and isolated from the inside 
by the Golden Shield, international reports on microblogging may serve as an entry point for 
understanding cultural specifics like E Gao and the Wu Mao Dang, thereby opening up some 
of the very culturally specific elements of ‘Chinanet’ to those outside of China.  
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As seen in the analysis of content relating to the Wenzhou train crash, the reality of online 
China demands a closer reading than a black and white picture of an evil and censoring 
authoritarian regime and citizens ready to storm the online barricades to fight for political 
reform and free speech; both support and criticism are part of the discussion on Sina Weibo, 
and there is no saying what kind of tool for communication Sina Weibo will develop into, as 
that depends both on Sina’ interactions with authorities and Weibo users, as well as actual use 
of the application by Netizens, and reactions to all such developments from the authorities. 
Even though Netizens could prove to be quite powerful in numbers, and perhaps also very 
reluctant to accept any alterations that would drastically change conditions for use of 
microblogs, one must never forget the Chinese authorities holds a tremendous technological 
power over the entire Chinese online space, including microblogs. In his assessment of the 
Chinese Internet, Lagerkvist (2006) does however remind us “[that] people who suddenly 
enjoy more political freedom than before are extremely unwilling to take even a single step 
back again” (p.128). Pursuit of continuous freedoms online, or at least a reluctance to let any 
achieved freedom go again, are part of the constant negotiations that take place in online 
China, and also via microblogs; the authorities has since the very beginning of the Internet in 
China appreciated the value oft the Net as part of modern progress, facilitating a thriving 
online space with an array of well-functioning applications. At the same time, as seen in 
critical comments regarding the Wenzhou train crash, Netizens will keep pushing towards the 
limits of what authorities find expectable within the official idea of a ‘harmonious society’, 
with critical expressions that are facilitated by the easy to use infrastructure of microblogs. 
Wedged in between are content providers like Sina, who are eager to please both Netizens 
with solid and user-friendly applications (to secure market shares) and demands set by he 
authorities (to secure that they are allowed to be part of the market at all). The dynamics 
between authoritarian regime, content providers and Netizens are crucial for the future 
position of microblogs in greater online China.  
A fascinating aspect of the greater online China, is that while discussion used to center on 
access to blocked sites in the shadows of the Great Firewall, it has now in many ways shifted 
towards a discussion of premises for applications within the limits of the Firewall. For the 
time being, ‘Chinanet’ seems securely contained, protected by a Golden Shield that offers 
enough leeway for expression and entertainment to keep Netizens from tearing down the 
Great Firewall. If the use of microblogging applications were to be severely restricted, or 
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removed completely, there is however no saying how Netizens would response. Online China 
is space full of tension, and many of those tensions become very visible within popular and 
dense microblogging applications. 
6.2 Microblogging and the public sphere 
In his reflections on collective actions, Calhoun (1993) notes that a political public sphere is 
successful when it “provides discourse about shared societal concerns that is both rational-
critical and influential” (p. 276). The rationality of a space such as Sina Weibo has been 
discussed; although it is a substantial source for information, an archive of discussions and 
opinions on a variety of topics of public concern, it is not necessarily trustworthy. Despite 
encouragements from the government to use Internet and microblogs as a tool for 
communication, applications like Sina Weibo has yet to demonstrate a lasting powerful 
offline influence in negotiations of power. There are however tendencies of perceived 
influence observed in Netizens, as we saw in the analysis of the Wenzhou train crash and 
particularly the post praising the power of microblogs as part of the reason for further 
investigations of the damaged train sets. With a strong authoritarian one-party state still in 
place, Chinese microblogging applications could turn out to be little more than a vent for 
frustration, favored by the Netizens because it opens possibilities for large-scale 
communications, while also being favored by the authorities, being able to keep track of the 
pulse of online public opinion within an environment they can control.  
Possible awareness amongst Netizens that use of microblogs could develop into something 
more powerful than a frustration-vent that would lead to substantial offline consequences with 
implications for Chinese society might also spark new awareness in perception of Chinese 
citizen-identity (Habermas 2006; Dahlgren 2005b). Even with renewed awareness amongst 
citizens, and a possibility to develop microblogs as a powerful tool for public expression, 
notion of Chinese microblogging applications as a normative public sphere quickly collapses 
due to the strong authoritarian presence. There are however great differences between theory 
and practice for use of the concept of a public sphere (Habermas 2006: 412); if microblogging 
tools serves to develop public understanding concerning rights and liberties, inclusion and 
equality and public deliberation (Habermas 2006: 412), they could have a real practical 
impact on Chinese citizens and their perception of collective identity in modern China.  
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Sina Weibo is however first and foremost an informal arena of communication, and even 
though there are numbers of profiles representing official entities, and many topics of public 
interest are discussed, there is no solid structure in place for gathering collective opinion 
across the fast-moving medium. If collective action were to grow on Sina Weibo, the 
application could very well develop as part of an emerging Chinese civic-culture and civil 
society (Dahlgren 2005b, 423; Lagerkvist 2010). At present, such an optimistic assessment is 
however subdued by but the amounts of chaff, misinformation and rumors found on the 
microblogging platform.  
Nevertheless, within the many informal deliberations Sina Weibo does have a function as an 
agenda-setting tool, as could be observed in the variations of content regarding the Wenzhou 
train crash. Were we however to add the agenda-setting functions of Sina Weibo to an 
imagined public sphere as “an intermediary system of communications between formally 
organized and informal face-to-face deliberations in arenas at both the top and the bottom of 
the political system” (Habermas 2006: 415), would the limitations of censorship and control 
yet again dampened enthusiasm for microblogs as a space for conceptual success towards the 
public sphere.  
The analysis regarding the train crash has however demonstrated how Sina Weibo might be 
viewed as an entry point into political conversation for Chinese Netizens, with politics serving 
in addition to the perhaps more popular themes of entertainment, gossip and other types of 
light-conversational topics. In that sense Sina Weibo could help to diffuse private opinions in 
a public space, where private opinions could find their way into a space of general public 
discourse, to a greater extent than within the traditional media channels, who by and large 
remain subdued to an array of content regulating directives 127.  
6.2.1 Structure, representation and interaction 
With international attention and half of Chinese Netizens reported to use microblogs, 
companies running these applications have secured important structural capital by developing 
microblogs as an alternative for personal publishing within a media sphere that otherwise is 
off-limits to most ordinary citizens. The structural dimension of microblogs as part of a public 
space is however greatly clouded by authoritarian control that also influences the 
                                                
127 See also Dahlgren (2005b) on schematic sequences of the non-political, the para-politcal and the fully 
political (p. 420) 
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representational dimensions of microblogs; Sina Weibo does represents a pluralism of views 
within a public space that in offline instances can be very conform, i.e. with no Chinese news 
papers reporting on the Wenzhou train crash the day after the accident. And even with an 
inherent agenda-setting function for popular discussion, rumors and content control restricts a 
lasting representational accuracy for opinion formation. On the other hand, representational 
dimension and technological features like opportunities for large-scale diffusion of 
information, and media ‘hybriditiy’ in media-rich posts aspects of microblogs are of great 
value to Netizens; it is not the infrastructure of Sina Weibo in it self that favors diffusion of 
misinformation and rumors. People, not technology, spread rumors. Sina does however have a 
responsibility to secure those aspects of microblogs that they can control; the many types of 
verification processes indicates an effort to make services appear trustworthy on different 
levels; trust towards users who use Sina Weibo services; trust towards the greater online space 
by indicating that information on Sina Weibo has been checked and verified, while also 
reassuring the authorities that they have their user base under (registered) control. Accounts 
used for spam is nevertheless still a real problem for Sina Weibo, with one report claiming 
that as much as 49% of all Weibo posts that are forwarded could stem from counterfeit 
profiles (Yu, Asur & Huberman 2012). The various verification options on Sina Weibo do not 
seem to work for a purpose of adding trustworthiness to the applications, on the contrary, they 
add confusion to an already quite chaotic space. 
Despite all shortcomings, microblogging applications like Sina Weibo has a tremendous 
strength in favoring interaction in a sense that favors the concept of a ‘public’ (Dahlgren 
2005; Dewey 1954). Mass media generally relates to a ‘public’ as being a passive audience; 
we can watch, listen and read, but possibilities for direct participation is limited. With 
applications like Sina Weibo the ‘public’ can receive information, share information and 
contest information. Interaction flows between groups of various sizes; some posts will be left 
with no repostings and no comments (but they might still be read by a unknown amount of 
Netizens) while other posts travel with great speed across the application, being rapidly 
shared and heavily debated.  
6.2.2 A meso-level space with macro- level possibilities 
Depending on use, Sina Weibo relates to both the micro- and meso- levels of a public space 
described by Keane (1995). Again it becomes a choice of the Netizens for how they apply the 
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application: by restricting use and interaction to a very limited number of other Weibo users, 
Sina Weibo could form an individual micro-space for personal publishing. With millions of 
‘fans’, and thousands of Weibo posts, other users seem to prefer interaction on a meso-level 
of public participation. The meso-level characteristics of Sina Weibo are more urgently 
present than the micro-level choices that could be made by each Netizen; with posts being 
open for all registered users to read it not only reduces levels of privacy, but also encourages 
interaction unhindered by geographical and class-related constraints. Sina Weibo also has a 
spatial potential on a macro-level; while Chinese Netizens encounter difficulties breaching the 
Great Fire Wall, there are no limitation for international Netizens who wish take a look on 
what is going on behind it. You will however, need to prepare yourself for maneuvering in a 
space that greatly favors use of Chinese language, and even if you are able to read and 
understand Chinese you will also have to tackle fast-moving slang to secure full 
comprehension.   
6.3 The (fragile) power of Weibo 
In reflection of Sina Weibo in relations of conceptual frames regarding the public sphere, 
Chinese microblogging applications has been identified as a public space with wide-reaching 
possibilities for interaction, that albeit contained within the space of ‘Chinanet’ could be of 
importance for public deliberation and debate. As the analysis of the infrastructure within the 
application indicated, there are hopes for being optimistic on behalf for Chinese 
microblogging tools as they offer easy-to-use functions for sharing information. Also, due to 
the massive and still growing popularity, you have the potential to be heard by many. There 
are however, as has also been identified throughout the study, clear limitations of Chinese 
microblogging applications, the most obvious being a clear presence of content control in 
blocking of keywords and removal of posts. Even with overt restrictions on content, Sina 
Weibo is identified as a space where Netizens can express an array of views in online 
discussion. During the first week after the Wenzhou train crash, Netizens raised a number of 
questions; some were very direct in mode of address, speaking openly of censorship and using 
harsh characteristics in their criticism of officials. Others framed their messages in a more 
discreet manner, adding in-direct comparisons and sarcasm to media-rich Weibo posts, which 
would require a more thorough interpretation by receivers to fully grasp their meaning. As 
part of a vibrant and creative online culture, in-direct meanings are a strong-point of 
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microblogging tools, but does also propose an almost ironic limitation to microblogs as vivid 
and creative use also affects trustworthiness of information that is diffused across the 
applications; the widespread presence of unverified information, misinformation and wild 
speculations does not help to build a reputation of microblogging as a reliable source of 
information and opinion formation in China. 
The Chinese authorities have also on numerous occasions demonstrated their very direct 
power within the Chinese online space, by blocking access to international sited and shutting 
down online access within China during times of civil unrest. During 2012 Chinese 
authorities have also introduced measures directly towards microblogs; in March 2012 
microblogging applications were issued a demand for real-name registration for all users (The 
Economist 2012; Global Times 2012), causing concern that authorities were stepping up 
measures of surveillance over Netizens. Also, following an online rumor of a coup stirring in 
Beijing in late March 2012, several popular microblogging applications, including Sina 
Weibo, were ordered to suspend comment functions on Weibo posts for three days (Chao 
2012). Apart from blocking Weibo predecessors like Fanfou altogether in 2009, this was the 
first major intervention into the infrastructure of microblogging platforms, demonstrating the 
very direct power of the authorities, while reminding Netizens that the power of Weibo may 
be real, but it is also fragile. 
Whether or not the Chinese online community will manage to create grounds for political 
change outside the fiber optical lines of cyber-communication is a question yet to be 
answered; Sina Weibo is a channel for entertainment and information, and even with explicit 
limitations towards content regulation, the opportunities for personal publishing and 
interaction are without doubt of value for Chinese citizens. The constant and inter-changing 
negotiations between authorities content providers and Netizens keeps ‘Chinanet’ in a 
constant state of exiting flux. This also challenges researchers and commentators to provide 
new and creative theoretical frames to suit this complex space; just as there is room for 
creativity in online China, there is room for creativity in theoretical and empirical reflections 
regarding this complex space. However, any claims and predictions about the future of 
‘Chinanet’, and their possible offline ramifications, should be stated with great consideration. 
Cultural understanding and caution in regards to developing trends are important guidelines in 
exploration of the Chinese cyberspace, as the Chinese complexities and online cultural 
phenomenon like Sina Weibo further sneaks into global awareness. If you enter this chaotic 
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and exiting space chances are that you will feel quite overwhelmed by all the amazing (and 
unbelievable) stories you encounter; a tragic train crash first reported online, billion of dollars 
of corruption, evidence being buried, and a little girl rescued against all odds. Whether you 
believe it or not, I believe it anyway - because it is all there for us to explore, debate, 
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